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Foreword
Empowered Sri Lanka, Sri Lanka’s development policy document, envisions reorienting the country toward a modern 
and high-value-adding economy that is able to compete effectively in the global market. Expanding the middle 
class and improving the living standards by creating 1 million jobs are at the core of the policy. This employment 
diagnostic study—Sri Lanka: Fostering Workforce Skills—seeks to support the realization of that vision. 
The country’s economy has been growing at an average of 6.4% for more than a decade (2004–2015). The growth 
was largely driven by higher investment and consumption during postwar reconstruction. Although growth has 
slowed since 2013 due to the difficult external environment, macroeconomic instability, and political transition, the 
growth outlook remains positive. Real growth of gross domestic product was 4.8% in 2015 and 4.4% in 2016, owing 
to the strong growth in services, agriculture, and manufacturing, although the latter’s contribution is declining 
marginally. “Working poverty” has declined while the average daily wage rates of casual workers have increased. 
The differences in wages narrowed across sectors and within skill groups.
The economy’s progress, however, may be impacted by an aging population that will put pressure on pensions 
and social expenditures. The slowing population growth will reduce the labor force participation rate and impede 
production in the economy. As it is, the country is also losing a large portion of its workforce to overseas employment. 
In addition, the education system faces new challenges in meeting the requirements of the economy. The poor 
funding and low enrollment rates in tertiary education and technical and vocational education and training (TVET) 
have resulted in youth unemployment and mismatches with the skills demanded by the business sector.
Concerted efforts are needed to address the challenges of a decreasing workforce, the poor funding and low 
participation rates in tertiary education and TVET, and the skills gap. The labor force could be built up by increasing its 
female participation. This could be achieved by removing barriers and instituting factors that enable and encourage 
their participation. Also, policies to decrease youth unemployment and increase net immigration, including the 
return of migrant workers from abroad, should be put in place. Bridging the skills gaps is also imperative. Policies to 
address these critical issues are discussed in the report.
This study was prepared by a team from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) Economic Research and Regional 
Cooperation Department (ERCD) under the supervision of Edimon Ginting, director of the Economic Analysis 
and Operational Support Division, ERCD, ADB, and Donglin Li, International Labour Organization (ILO) country 
director for Sri Lanka and the Maldives. The study was initially co-led by Utsav Kumar, economist, and Sakiko Tanaka, 
senior social sector specialist, and subsequently by Kiyoshi Taniguchi, senior economist, who prepared the full draft 
report. The core project team comprises Ye Xu, young professional, and Lilibeth Poot, economics officer at ADB; 
Nomaan Majid, senior employment specialist, ILO Decent Work Team for South Asia, and Ramani Gunatilaka, ILO 
consultant who prepared Chapter 5 of the report; and experts including Nisha Arunatilake (consultant for Chapter 
iv
2), Sewin Chan and Ravindra Rannan-Eliya (consultants for Chapter 3), and Priyanka Jayawardena and Ronald 
Miller (consultants for Chapter 4). Gee Ann Carol Burac and Amanda Isabel Mamon provided administrative 
support. The report was reviewed by Christopher Manning and Daryll Naval and edited by Jill Gale de Villa and Eric 
Van Zant. Michael Cortes accomplished the layout, cover design, and typesetting.
The study benefited from inputs from numerous people and organizations. The study team consulted 
representatives from key government agencies, academic and research institutions, and the private sector about 
the framework, approach, and findings. The ADB South Asia Regional Department provided useful comments for 
enhancing the relevance of the report. The authors also acknowledge the excellent support from ADB’s Sri Lanka 
Resident Mission staff, led by country director Sri Widowati, and supported by Tadateru Hayashi, senior economist, 
in facilitating the dialogue and collaboration with the government.
The study team especially thanks the Government of Sri Lanka for its support. 
Tomoko Nishimoto
Assistant Director-General and 
Regional Director for Asia and the Pacific
International Labour Organization
Yasuyuki Sawada
Chief Economist and Director General
Economic Research and Regional Cooperation Department
Asian Development Bank
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1Summary and Highlights
Chapter 1
 Summary and highlights
dipping to 3.5% following the global financial crisis of 
2008, postwar recovery and expansion pushed the rate 
over 9% in 2012. Growth then weakened to an average 
of 4.4% in recent years, which is attributed to internal 
and external factors including the winding down of 
debt-financed post-recovery infrastructure projects 
and the reduced demand for exports. With relatively 
good economic growth, the country achieved middle-
income status in 2010 and is projected to achieve 
upper middle-income status in the next few years. 
Several factors explain the recent healthy income 
growth per capita. First, the population increased only 
0.8% from 2004 to 2015, even while gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita purchasing power parity 
almost doubled to more than $11,000 in 2015.1 
Second, value-added per worker expanded across all 
economic sectors (except agriculture) and especially 
in manufacturing, where productivity growth was high 
during 2006–2014. Third, the major public sector 
infrastructure development projects have been playing 
a pivotal role to underpin economic growth. 
The expected slowdown in labor force growth 
will pose challenges to the economy. In regard 
to labor supply, projections suggest the labor force 
will increase very gradually until 2028. It will then 
start to shrink as the labor force participation rate 
(LFPR) declines and population growth slows, 
especially among the working-age population. Labor 
1.1. Main Themes and Organization
 
The report starts with an overview of the labor market 
in relation to both labor supply and demand. It then 
looks at the issues of aging and skill generation. 
The concluding chapter examines links between 
labor market trends, informality, and poverty. The 
report identifies two major challenges for the labor 
market in Sri Lanka: (1) coping with the aging of 
the population; and (2) generating new skills that 
are currently in demand, and that will drive future 
productivity growth. Welfare implications of recent 
growth have been positive, even though this growth 
has been characterized by increased informalization. 
Productivity growth has increased, and poverty among 
the self-employed has declined, both of which have 
driven a large fall in overall poverty incidence from the 
mid-2000s. But the slow growth of the formal sector 
is a problem for the security of employment and 
investments in human capital.
1.2. Labor Market Assessment
Overall, the Sri Lankan economy continued to grow 
strongly in the 2000s despite domestic and global 
shocks. Sri Lanka’s economy expanded at an average 
annual growth rate of 6.4% during 2004–2015. The 
economic growth, however, has been episodic. After 
____________________
1 In constant 2011 international United States dollars.
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force participation declined most among the youth 
but it also decreased among women and people in 
rural and estate (plantation) areas; it increased only 
among college graduates. Sri Lanka is also losing 
many workers to foreign employment, which has both 
positive dimensions (especially remittances) as well as 
negative effects for growth (shortages of blue collar 
workers).
The country has not produced enough jobs for its 
labor force, leading to an increase in vulnerable 
employment. On the demand side, the number of 
formal jobs grew slowly and vulnerable employment 
accounted for a high share of jobs. Job creation has 
not kept pace with the rising working-age population 
and almost one-third of all jobs remain in low-
productivity agriculture. Just over half of the jobs 
created were in the public sector. But at the same 
time the increase in jobs included a nominal increase 
in vulnerable employment—in self-employed or 
unpaid family work. Employment elasticities fell from 
the early 2000s, partly because of slower economic 
and labor force growth, and partly due to the loss 
of jobs in agriculture, as people moved into a range 
of service activities. Although public sector jobs 
increased faster than private sector jobs in the formal 
sector, manufacturing was the biggest contributor 
to new jobs especially in the most recent period, 
2010–2014. The increase in employment was mainly 
in urban areas (i.e., of the 366,918 new jobs, 88.3% 
were urban).
Even though gender gaps in average earnings 
remained large, the monthly real earnings of 
wage employees increased, particularly for 
the less educated. Real wages rose overall during 
2006–2014, especially during the reconstruction 
period of 2011–2013. The sharp wage rises for the 
less educated suggests the beginning of a tightening 
of labor markets for unskilled workers. The largest 
increases were in unspecified other services, followed 
by agriculture and mining. Consistent with improving 
real wages, unemployment has also fallen to under 
5%. However, the gaps between the male and 
female average earnings and unemployment rates 
remained high.
1.3.  Demographic Change and 
Labor Market Impacts
The population will age rapidly during the next 
few decades, which will slow labor force growth, 
and may cause it to contract. Sri Lanka’s population 
is aging rapidly. Both fertility and especially mortality 
declined relatively early by regional standards. By 1994, 
Sri Lanka’s total fertility rate had already reached the 
replacement level of 2.1, and the rate continued to 
fall in the 2000s. Universal health care and free basic 
education underpinned these changes. As a result, 
the working population grew rapidly starting in the 
1970s, producing a low dependency ratio and hence a 
demographic dividend through to the early 2000s. But 
by 2015 the share of the elderly population (65 years 
and above) was beginning to approach 10% and the 
dependency ratio was beginning to rise more sharply. 
Rapid aging is expected to continue for the next few 
decades, which will slow labor force growth. The labor 
force may shrink outright as early as 2030. A forecasting 
exercise showing three different aging scenarios (low, 
middle-, and high-aging scenarios) showed that 
the elderly population will grow dramatically in the 
coming decades, bringing an end to the demographic 
dividend. In the middle-aging scenario, the elderly 
fraction will have doubled by 2038 relative to the 
2015 baseline. The increase in the elderly population 
will consequently increase the country’s dependency 
ratio, to reach 76% by 2050. The population aging will 
contribute to a decline in the LFPR. 
The population aging will shrink GDP and put 
moderate pressure on pension and health 
expenditures. The decline in the working-age 
population will impact the economy on several fronts. 
A younger labor force is associated with greater 
sectoral mobility and greater willingness to adopt 
new technologies while societal aging reduces labor 
supply and potentially leaves a less dynamic workforce 
which poses a challenge for structural transition 
and economic development. A growth-accounting 
approach showed that GDP would be more than 7% 
lower in 2030, simply because of the slower growth of 
the working-age population. The higher share of the 
elderly will decrease demographically determined tax 
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contributions and increase the tax burden on social 
welfare. Population aging is expected to put moderate 
pressure on pension expenditure, somewhat offset by 
recent increases in the retirement age and cushioned 
by private contributions to the Employees’ Provident 
Fund and a modest plan to extend pensions to farmers. 
Similarly, the aging population will only put moderate 
pressures on health expenditure. Maintaining public 
spending at about 50% of total health spending may 
be sufficient to cope with most aging pressures until 
2030, although the share of overall spending will need 
to increase, by about 0.5% of GDP. Policies to minimize 
the fiscal burden of aging should be directed toward 
reducing barriers to female work and fair wages, thus 
raising LFPRs among females. Raising the female 
LFPR to the average level observed in high-income 
countries would increase the overall labor force by 
17%. In addition, it is also imperative to reduce youth 
unemployment rates, and provide more incentives for 
migrants to return to work at home rather than abroad.
1.4.  Schooling Quality and Skills 
Development
The Sri Lankan education system has historically 
been equitable but is underfunded and requires 
reform to generate the skills needed for future 
growth. For decades, Sri Lanka has demonstrated 
that a relatively poor country can provide educational 
opportunities widely to the general public through 
a commitment to free public education from 
kindergarten to university. The public education 
system offers comprehensive coverage from early 
childhood through tertiary and postgraduate 
education, including vocational schooling. Completion 
of primary school through 5th grade is near universal, 
as is literacy among young people. The change in the 
medium of instruction from English to Sinhalese or 
Tamil, and nationalization of private schools in 1961 
greatly improved access to education. The National 
Education Commission introduced curriculum reforms 
over the years, but there was little change in the quality 
of education and the education system still features an 
over-loaded curriculum, outdated teaching methods, 
and a traditional examination system that requires 
only memorizing information.
 
Poor funding of education has partly contributed to 
the low quality and low enrollments at the tertiary 
level and in vocational education. Historically, Sri 
Lanka invested 2%–3% of GDP in education, but this 
declined after 2010 as the government focused more 
on infrastructure investment during 2010–2014. 
Recent government policy statements point to a 
renewed public investment in the sector, recognizing 
the need to equip young school leavers with the skills 
required for sustained economic growth. However, 
spending on the sector remains among the lowest in 
Asia, which is mostly devoted to teachers’ salaries and 
welfare programs and held back capital spending on 
education. Despite almost universal enrollments at 
lower levels of education, net enrollment rates were 
low (only 43%) at the college level, partly because of a 
high rate of drop-outs due to poor performance on the 
national level examinations. Gross tertiary enrollment 
rates (21%) were below the averages for lower middle-
income countries, owing to capacity constraints 
within the state university system and the absence 
of a parallel system of private sector involvement. 
The technical and vocational education and training 
sector is not able to produce enough qualified, skilled 
workers to respond to changing labor market needs 
and a majority of school leavers have no access to 
skills development programs. Technical and vocational 
education and training is perceived to have varying 
standards and offer weak courses that do not cater to 
market demands.
1.5. Welfare Dimensions of 
Employment Change
Productivity has risen even though the economy 
has experienced an increase in informalization. 
This appears to be counterintuitive because informal 
workers are less likely to be productive than formal 
workers. The significant decline in formal employment 
(conversely, an increase in informal employment) 
was observed mainly in agriculture and, surprisingly, 
in industry, as well, albeit at a much lesser degree. 
Productivity in agriculture had a small decline (by 1%) 
in 2006–2014 while productivity in the industry sector 
rose the most (59%) among the three sectors. Only 
the services sector has seen its formal employment 
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share rise (to almost 50% in 2014), complemented 
by a rise in productivity. The unusual concurrence of 
both rising informal employment and productivity 
may be partly explained by (1) the relative expansion 
of formal workers in sectors and subsectors where 
productivity has also been rising, and (2) the changing 
skills composition of employment and rising levels of 
educational attainment of both formal and informal 
workers across sectors.
Economic gains in recent years have helped reduce 
working poverty in both the formal and informal 
sectors. The country also made notable progress in 
reducing poverty. The incidence of working poverty 
in Sri Lanka (i.e., the proportion of employed persons 
who belong to poor households) halved during 
2006/07–2012/13 (from 13.8% to 5.4%). Working 
poverty rates declined in all four sectors: agriculture, 
industry, construction, and services. With the shift 
of employment away from agriculture to industry, 
agriculture’s share of the working poor has fallen while 
industry’s share actually increased (from 14% to 18%) 
in contrast to the quite large decline in working poverty 
in the service sector (from 31% to 21%).
Even though self-employment and employment in 
the informal sector have increased, the incidence of 
working poverty among the self-employed decreased 
quite sharply, from 11% to 4% during the same period, 
accompanied by an increase in real labor earnings as the 
country moves toward a higher level of income. While 
the incidence of casual labor has risen, its average daily 
cash wages have increased significantly in real terms in 
every sector.
With the foregoing observations, this report puts 
forth a set of recommendations for the Sri Lanka 
government. A clear national strategy for the labor sector 
that addresses the expected demographic changes and 
the needs of the employers, employees, and government 
is vital. Productive job creation and provision of necessary 
skills and vocational training for the youth who are 
engaged in unproductive employment are imperative, 
and require detailed analysis and proper implementation 
arrangements. Mobilizing the female workforce 
is vital, particularly in supporting women leaders 
who will inspire other females to value and join the 
workforce. Given rising informality in the context of 
productivity increase, the government will need to 
continue investing in social protection and improving 
workers’ welfare.
5Labor Market Assessment
Chapter 2
Labor Market Assessment: 
overview of Sri Lanka’s 
demographic and Labor Market
public investment and consumption. Although the 
country has faced an increasingly difficult external 
environment, macroeconomic instability, and a 
significant political transition in the 2 years through 
2015, the economic growth outlook remains positive. 
Growth of real gross domestic product (GDP) was 
4.8% and 4.4% in 2015 and 2016, respectively; the 
slight dip owing to the declining contribution of 
exports (ADB 2016a). 
Agriculture accounted for a mere 7.9% of GDP; 
industry, for 35.5% (of which manufacturing is 15.7%); 
and services, for 56.6%. With rapid economic growth 
and extensive coverage of public education and health 
care programs, the head count poverty ratio declined 
from 15.2% in 2006/07 to 6.7% in 2012/13. Sri Lanka is 
likely to attain upper middle-income country status in 
the next few years. 
An increase in labor productivity is essential to sustain 
economic growth and to maintain the economy’s 
competitiveness. Sri Lanka has performed well on 
labor productivity compared to its Asian peers. Figure 
2.2 compares the labor productivity of eight Asian 
economies. Sri Lanka is positioned at the top of the 
eight compared countries. Figure 2.3 compares the 
movement of GDP per capita and labor productivity 
at 2011 purchasing power parities. The movement 
2.1. Overview of Economic 
Development 
The economy has grown at an average rate of 6.4% 
from 2004 to 2015 (Figure 2.1),2 with per capita gross 
national income increasing from $2,430 in 2010 to 
$3,800 by 2015.3 Postwar reconstruction aided this 
impressive performance, driven largely by higher 
____________________
2 Growth was also robust, at 6% a year during 2005–2010. Growth since the end of the civil war was driven by the nontradable sectors: construction, transport, 
domestic trade, banking and insurance, and real estate. This pattern of growth is unlikely to be sustainable for the next 5 years. This estimate is based on rebased 
gross domestic product values in constant 2010 prices.
3  World Bank, WDI (accessed 20 January 2017).
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Figure 2.1 Average Annual GDP Growth Rate 
2004–2015
GDP = gross domestic product.
Source: World Bank, WDI (accessed January 2017).
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____________________
4 Employment intensity is “a numerical measure of how employment varies with economic output” (Kapsos 2006: 143).
of GDP per capita and labor productivity are very 
similar in trend, which implies that the labor market 
is functioning well from the macroeconomic point 
of view.
Empowered Sri Lanka, the present government’s 
development policy document, was launched in 
January 2017 and envisages reorienting the economy 
toward a modern and high-value-adding economy 
that is able to compete effectively in the global 
market. The policy gives particular attention to 
creating 1 million jobs, expanding the middle class, 
and improving workers’ living standards. This 
stated goal of creating employment is to 
be achieved by encouraging investments in 
high employment-intensity sectors4 on the 
demand side and by improving skills on the 
supply side. 
These objectives were presented at a critical 
juncture in the economy’s development. The initial 
boost to the economy took place at the end of the 
separatist conflict in 2009, driven by construction 
(mainly in infrastructure development), retail trade, 
and transport. The initial boost was not sustainable for 
very long. Economic growth rates, above 8% in 2011 
and 2012, declined to below 5% from 2013 on (MOFP 
2015). Both internal and external factors influenced 
this economic downturn (Institute of Policy Studies 
2016). Extensive foreign and domestic borrowing 
to finance infrastructure development projects, 
heavy losses by state-owned enterprises, increased 
expenditure on social services, and declining 
government revenue constrained government 
finances and eroded macroeconomic stability. 
Figure 2.3: GDP per Capita and Labor 
Productivity, 1956–2016 (‘000)
Note: Both labor productivity and per capita GDP are converted at the 
2015 prices with updated 2011 purchasing power parities.
Sources: Total Economy Database (accessed  May 2017) and ADB 
estimates. 
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In this environment, it was difficult to mobilize private 
sector investment. At the same time, the economy was 
experiencing repercussions from the global financial 
crisis that emerged in 2008, mainly in reduced demand 
for exports. Sri Lanka was slow to recover from the 
crisis, and the increased attention that the previous 
government gave to developing infrastructure at the 
expense of the social sectors will not lead to long-run 
economic growth. Over time, demands for improving 
the social sector increased with labor shortages. 
The new government in 2015 has reoriented the focus 
to activating the private sector and foreign investors 
in order to drive the economy and create jobs, looking 
more toward exports and employment abroad. To 
achieve this end, the government has prioritized 
improving the business environment and stabilizing 
the macroeconomy.
An expansion in value-added output across all sectors 
of the economy brought growth, but expansion in 
construcition and services appear to have been the 
principal driver. Productivity has risen across industry, 
construction, and services, and slipped slightly in 
agriculture (Figure 2.4). 
The result has been moderated growth, where 
industrialization has not taken place at the expense 
of other sectors. This is evident in Figure 2.5, which, 
again, shows that industry achieved the greatest gain 
in value-added shares from 2006 to 2014. In contrast, 
contributions to GDP by the construction and services 
sectors have remained stable while agriculture’s share 
has declined marginally. 
Labor force projections show that the labor force will 
increase very gradually until 2028, and then start to 
decline (Figure 2.6).5 This could impede economic 
growth unless counteracted by more intensive capital 
investment for improving productivity. Analysis 
of labor force growth shows two main reasons for 
the slowdown: (1) decreasing population growth, 
especially among the working-age population; and 
(2) declining labor force participation rates (LFPRs).
 
____________________
5 The projections assume that the labor force participation rate remains unchanged until 2050. This is not an unreasonable assumption, as labor force participation 
has not changed much in the population over the years, especially among 30–64-year-olds. 
Total GDP (25%)
Construction (10%)
Services (23%)
Industry (59%)
Agriculture (–1%)
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2006 2014
Figure 2.4: Change in Value Added per 
Worker, by Sector, 2006 and 2014 (%)
Figure 2.5: Contribution to GDP by Sector, 
2006 and 2014
GDP = gross domestic product.
Note: Figures in parentheses are productivity growth rates in the four 
sectors over the period, where productivity denotes value added per 
worker in the sector.
Sources: Calculations using microdata from DCS (2007, 2015b) and 
sectoral GDP data from CBSL (various years). 
GDP = gross domestic product.
Source: CBSL (2015).
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____________________
6 The figures quoted here differ from those of the Labour Force Survey, which does not include the Northern and Eastern provinces, and they are for people aged 
15 to 64.
7  These rates are for 15–64 year-olds, and thus are not directly comparable to official statistics for the 15 and above population.
2.2.  Slowdown in Population 
Growth
Sri Lanka has entered a demographic transition 
characterized by low birth and death rates. The 
working-age population is projected to decline from 
2014 to 2048 (Figure 2.7). The net result is an aging 
of society and a rising age dependency ratio. The size 
of the elderly population will increase significantly: 
for every 100 elderly people in 2014 there will be 253 
by 2048. 
2.3.  Labor Force Participation
The LFPR declined from 2006 to 2014 among all types 
of workers, with only a few exceptions (Figure 2.8).6 
This decline was sharpest among the youth, which may 
be an effect of increased school attendance. LFPRs 
among graduates with degrees increased 1 percentage 
point. The LFPRs of women and people in rural and 
plantation (estate) areas declined. 
Considerable gender and regional disparities are 
observed in labor force participation and employment 
(ADB 2016b). The overall LFPR was 53.8% in 2013, 
but the female LFPR, at 35.6%, was less than half that 
of males, at 74.9%, as noted earlier. This pattern has 
remained unchanged for a long time (DCS 2014). 
As Figure 2.9 shows, the female LFPR in the majority 
of the districts was less than half the male rates. 
Anuradhapura, Badulla, Kurunegala, Nuwara Eliya, and 
Ratnapura districts are the only exceptions. In fact, the 
female LFPRs in all the districts in the Northern and 
Eastern provinces, at about 15%–22%, are lower than 
those in other districts and less than one-third of the 
male LFPRs. 
Low LFPRs among women is the main reason for 
the low overall LFPR, providing substantial room 
for increasing the supply of labor by increasing the 
female LFPR. Female LFPRs in more advanced 
Asian economies such as the Republic of Korea and 
Singapore are significantly higher than those in Sri 
Lanka (Figure 2.10). Indeed, Sri Lanka’s female LFPR 
declined from 43.0% in 2006 to 40.4% in 2014.7 
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Figure 2.6: Labor Force Projections,  
2014–2048
Figure 2.7: Working-Age Population 
Projections by Age Category, 2014–2048
Note: Working age is 15 to 64 years.
Sources: Calculations using data from DCS (various years) Sri Lanka 
Labour Force Survey: Annual Reports; and United Nations Population 
Division (2016). 
Sources: Calculations using data from DCS (various years) Sri Lanka 
Labour Force Survey: Annual Reports, and United Nations Population 
Division (2016).
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 Figure 2.8: Difference in Labor Force Participation Rate, 2014 Relative to 2006
Figure 2.9: Labor Force Participation Rates by Gender and by District, 2013
Note: Excluding Northern and Eastern provinces. “Estate sector” refers to individuals living on plantations.
Source: Calculations based on DCS (various years), Sri Lanka Labour Force Survey data.
Note: Districts are ordered by ascending rates of female labor force participation.
Source: DCS (2014).
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Female employment has remained lower than that of 
males over the years (Figure 2.11). Gunatilaka (2013) 
finds a variety of reasons for low female participation. 
These include high reservation wages due to high 
levels of education attainment; high family incomes 
from remittances or spousal income; cultural factors 
(e.g., women in some culture groups are less likely 
than others to participate in the economy); and 
local labor market characteristics (such as high 
local unemployment rates) that reduced women’s 
LFPRs. However, high female LFPRs in agricultural 
employment increased the overall female LFPR. 
Policies promoting flexible work arrangements, better 
jobs, better quality and more affordable childcare 
facilities, and improved transport services could help 
increase female LFPRs (Gunatilaka 2013).
In Figure 2.12, the female LFPR shows a shallow 
inverse “U” shape tilted toward higher-skilled women, 
and women with middle-level education (implying 
skills) show the lowest LFPR. In fact, the LFPR of the 
highest-skilled females was comparable to that of 
males. Among degree holders, the LFPR of women 
surpasses that of men. This could be partly because 
successive governments have awarded public sector 
jobs to unemployed graduates from time to time, and 
women benefitted more than men from an increase in 
public sector employment during 2006–2014. Low-
skilled women exhibit lower LFPRs, which has held 
over time, because such women tend to stay at home.
Given that labor force growth is decreasing and the 
labor force will ultimately shrink, it is important that 
all available workers are employed productively. 
Indeed, the unemployment rate fell sharply, from 6.7% 
in 2006 to 4.4% in 2014, and the drop appears in all 
population groups, possibly indicating a broad-based 
improvement in the labor market. Although female 
unemployment is consistently higher than male 
unemployment, the decline in female unemployment 
is sharper (Figure 2.13).
Both sexes
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by Sex (Age 15 and Above), 2002–2011
Figure 2.12: Labor Force Participation Rate by 
Gender and Education, 2006 and 2014 
Note: The employment-to-population ratio is the ratio of the employed 
population to the total population of working age.
Source: Based on DCS (various years), Sri Lanka Labour Force Survey: 
Annual Reports.
A-Level = Advanced Level, O-Level = Ordinary Level.
Note: Excludes Northern and Eastern provinces.
Source: Compilation based on DCS (various years) Sri Lanka Labour 
Force Survey data.
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ratio came down from 57.1% in 2006 to 56.6% in 2014, 
indicating a marginal deterioration in job creation. 
The share of wage workers increased from 56.8% in 
2006 to 57.8% in 2014, and the increase is greater for 
formal sector workers, indicating a marginal increase 
in better jobs. This increase is mainly explained by the 
rise in the number of nonagricultural wage workers. In 
2014, 28.0% of the total employment was in formal 
wage employment, with the public and formal private 
sectors contributing 14.7% and 13.3%, respectively, to 
total employment. Although the increase in formal 
sector employment was positive, we will see later that 
a large percentage of workers were in the informal 
sector and are considered vulnerable. 
The increased share of wage workers was mainly due 
to the increase in public sector employment (Figure 
2.14). Of the total increase in employment, 51.8% 
(190,087 jobs) were public sector jobs. Formal private 
sector jobs also grew substantially, while the growth in 
informal sector jobs was smaller. 
2.4.  Characteristics of Job Growth
Nonagricultural employment has grown faster than 
agricultural employment, indicating a shift away 
from agriculture. Nonagricultural employment 
increased from 69% of total employment in 2006 
to 73% in 2014. Still, more than one-quarter of 
total employment remains in agriculture, indicating 
that a large proportion of the population depends 
on this sector for employment. As such, policies 
for improving agriculture’s productivity would help 
improve the living standards of people employed in 
the sector.
The increase in employment has not kept pace with 
the increase in the working-age population. From 
2006 to 2014, total jobs increased by 366,918 (or 
5.4%). But the increase in total jobs is below that 
in the working-age population (at 763,957) and its 
growth (of 6.4%) over the same period. Employment 
as a percentage of the population is often used as an 
indication of the economy’s ability to create jobs. This 
Figure 2.13: Unemployment Rate by Age, Sex, Education Level, and Location, 2006 and 2014 (%)
Note: Excludes Northern and Eastern provinces.
Source: Compilation based on DCS (various years) Labour Force Survey data.
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Older and female workers benefited most from this 
increase in public sector jobs: 70.0% of the jobs 
were taken by women, and 41.4% is explained by the 
increase in public sector jobs for 50–59 year-olds. The 
increases in public sector jobs for 30–39 year-olds 
(26.3% of the increase) and 40–49 year-olds (22.0%) 
were also substantial. The increase in public sector 
employment for 25–39 year-olds is partly explained 
by the graduate employment placement programs 
of successive governments.8 Finally, the increase in 
employment was mainly in urban areas (i.e., of the 
366,918 new jobs, 88.3% were urban).
The increase in jobs included an increase in vulnerable 
employment—largely comprising the self-employed 
or unpaid family workers, the majority of whom are 
informally employed with few or no social security 
benefits such as old-age retirement, paid leave, and 
medical insurance. Statistics show no significant 
reduction in the share of self-employed and unpaid 
family workers in total employment for more than 2 
decades: in 2014, close to 40.0% of employment was 
vulnerable, virtually unchanged from 40.1% in 2006. A 
high percentage of vulnerable workers indicates lower 
quality jobs. Although employment trends are moving 
in the right direction, the changes are happening 
rather slowly.
The percentage of self-employed and unpaid family 
workers in the total employment varied significantly 
across districts (Figure 2.15). Percentages of self-
employed and unpaid family workers, both males and 
females, are lowest in Colombo, Gampaha, Kalutara, 
and Nuwara Eliya. The percentages were highest in 
Monaragala (67.9% for females and 64.4% for males), 
followed by Anuradhapura (65.4% for females and 
57.6% for males). Figure 2.9 shows that the LFPRs in 
Anuradhapura (66.5%) and Monaragala (63.2%) were 
high, but Figure 2.15 shows that nearly one-third of the 
jobs were informal.  
____________________
8 Many public sector jobs were created to cater to employment demands from recent graduates. But the government is unlikely to be able to continue to 
employ such large numbers of graduates. More sustainable employment creation is needed. A recent survey by the National Human Resource Development 
Council suggests that public sector unemployed graduate recruitments are not strategically placed (NHRDC 2013). About 48% of the survey interviewees were 
dissatisfied with the way graduates were recruited, mainly because of political interference (43%), unsystematic methods of recruitment (33%), and recruitment 
not aligned with degree qualification (8%). New recruits’ suggestions for improving recruitment also revealed that such recruitments are unlikely to enhance 
public sector productivity. For example, 30% recommended avoiding political interference in recruitments, 23% recommended recruiting for existing vacancies, 
20% recommended recruiting for a position worthy of a graduate, and 16% recommended recruitments should match the subject of the degree.
Figure 2.14: Contribution to Difference in Job Growth, 2006 to 2014
Note: From 2006 to 2014, the total jobs in Sri Lanka increased by 366,918. The figure shows the contribution of different types of jobs to this growth as a percent 
of the total increase.
Source: Calculations based on DCS (various years), Sri Lanka Labour Force Survey data.
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2.5.  Employment Intensity of 
Growth
The biggest contributor to the average 6.4% GDP 
growth between 2010 and 2015 was the services 
sector, closely followed by industry. The increase 
was accompanied by marginal employment growth, 
averaging 1.02% annually during 2011–2014 (Table 2.1). 
Employment growth was highest in the industry sector 
(4.27%), followed by services (2.69%). Employment in 
agriculture declined during the same period.
Economic growth was less employment-intensive 
during 2011–2014, and the employment intensity of 
growth has declined. For example, a 1% increase in 
GDP growth was associated with a 1.16% increase in 
employment during 1996–2002. But during 2011–
2014, a 1% increase in growth caused only a 0.16% 
increase in employment. 
This decline in the overall employment elasticity (i.e., 
the percent increase in employment relative to a 1% 
increase in growth) is mainly due to the decline in the 
employment elasticity in the agriculture sector. During 
2011–2014, employment in agriculture declined despite 
an annual average output growth of 4.2%. This indicates 
that, during 2011–2014, agriculture’s productivity rose 
but its employment contracted. Employment intensity 
Figure 2.15: Self-Employed and Unpaid Family Workers in Total Employment, 2012
Source: Based on UNDP (2015).
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Table 2.1: Employment, Output Growth, and 
Elasticity in Sri Lanka, 1996–2014
Sources: Data in the first two columns are from Chandrasiri (2013); figures in 
the last column are author’s calculations based on MOFP (2015). 
Growth, Value Added, and 
Employment Elasticity 1996–2002 2002–2010 2011–2014
Agriculture
Annual employment 
growth (%)
2.31 0.81 -3.69
Annual value-added 
growth (%)
1.90 5.00 4.20
Employment elasticity 1.23 0.17 -0.9
Industry
Annual employment 
growth (%)
2.31 3.16 4.27
Annual value-added 
growth (%)
4.50 8.00 6.50
Employment elasticity 0.52 0.38 0.66
Services
Annual employment 
growth (%)
5.02 1.02 2.69
Annual value-added 
growth (%)
5.40 8.00 7.30
Employment elasticity 0.94 0.13 0.37
All Sectors
Annual employment 
growth (%)
5.02 1.02 1.02
Annual value-added 
growth (%)
4.30 8.00 6.50
Employment elasticity 1.16 0.17 0.16
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in the services and manufacturing sectors increased; 
in both, employment elasticities were less than 1 
but greater than 0, indicating that the two sectors 
had experienced employment growth accompanied 
by productivity growth. The statistics suggest that 
investments in industry and services could result 
in output growth that would also lead to increased 
employment. 
Due to changes to data availability and categorization, 
it is impossible to examine directly how growth has 
contributed to employment generation in subsectors 
of the economy. However, a cursory look at the 
available data indicates that growth did generate jobs 
in certain sectors. The subsectors that contributed to 
GDP growth have also contributed to employment 
creation (Figure 2.16). For example, the number of 
people employed clearly increased in manufacturing; 
construction; mining and quarrying; and electricity, 
gas, and water supply. Employment also increased 
marginally in wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor 
vehicles, motorcycles, and personal and household 
goods; and transport, storage, and communication 
subsectors. An exception was financial intermediation 
Figure 2.16: Trends in Employment by Selected Industry, 2010–2014
Notes: Data for 2013 and 2014 are not directly comparable to data from prior years for two reasons. (1) Data for 2010 to 2012 exclude the Northern Province, 
while data for 2013 and 2014 are for all provinces. (2) The 2010 to 2012 data use International Standard Industry Classification (ISIC) from the third revision to 
the fourth revision in 2013. The graph approximately matches the ISIC fourth revision to ISIC third revision for 2013 and 2014.
Sources: DCS (various years), Sri Lanka Labour Force Survey: Annual Reports.
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and real estate, renting, and business activities, 
where employment declined although the subsectors 
contributed significantly to growth.
2.6.  Wage Decomposition
Monthly real earnings by wage employees have 
increased for all employee categories (Figure 2.17). The 
gaps between the male and female average monthly 
earnings and female and youth monthly earnings have 
increased, albeit marginally. 
From 2006 to 2011, the greatest increase in monthly 
real earnings was in “other services, unspecified,” 
followed by agriculture and mining (Figure 2.18). 
The lowest increase in monthly earnings was seen in 
community and family-oriented services. These trends 
in real wages somewhat explain the employment trends 
by industry. The highest job growth was also observed 
for “other services, unspecified,” while the largest 
decline in employment was seen in “community and 
family-oriented services.” Employment in agriculture 
declined despite an increase in real wages in this 
sector, as noted. The data suggest that the earnings 
growth in the services sector is taking place mainly in 
small-scale, unspecified service industries.
The monthly and the hourly real earnings both 
increased for all workers, with the earning trends 
favoring the less-skilled workers (Figures 2.19 and 
2.20). That the monthly earnings of less-skilled 
workers increased more than their hourly earnings 
suggests that they are also working longer hours. 
Conversely, the hours typically worked by the higher 
skilled workers were reduced. For example, from 2006 
to 2014, the time worked decreased by 0.30 hours for 
people with postgraduate degrees and by 0.13 hours 
among those with undergraduate degrees.
Figure 2.18: Monthly Real Earnings Growth 
by Industry, 2006 to 2011 
Note: Wages are given in 2006/07 rupees. Industrial codes used by 
DCS changed in 2013, therefore, trends from 2006 to 2014 cannot be 
calculated.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on DCS (various years), Sri Lanka 
Labour Force Survey: Annual Reports.
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Figure 2.17: Monthly Real Earnings of  
Wage Employees, 2006–2014
SLRs = Sri Lanka rupees.
Note: Wages are given in 2006/07 rupees.
Source: DCS (various years), Sri Lanka Labour Force Survey: Annual 
Reports.
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2.7. Labor Migration
While the growth of Sri Lanka’s labor force is slowing, 
the country is also losing many workers to foreign 
employment. In 2013, close to 300,000 people went 
abroad for jobs, and the number has increased steadily 
since 2002 (Figure 2.21). Census data for 2012 show 
that 6.5% of people 18 and above were temporarily 
residing abroad (Arunatilake 2016). 
The government’s foreign employment policies need 
to account for the country’s labor market requirements 
as well as its foreign exchange requirements. Despite a 
slowdown in the growth of the labor force, successive 
governments have promoted foreign employment, 
as foreign remittances are important for earning 
foreign exchange. To cater to the domestic needs 
of the labor market, the country will need to make 
employment more attractive within the country. This 
includes improving compensation and the working 
environment. Further, to reduce reliance on worker 
remittances, the avenues for earning foreign exchange 
will need to be diversified.
Figure 2.19: Change in Monthly Real Wages, 
2006–2014
Figure 2.20: Change in Hourly Real Wages by 
Level of Education, 2006–2014
Figure 2.21: Departures for Foreign 
Employment by Gender, 2002–2013 
SLRs = Sri Lanka rupees.
Note: Wages are in 2006/07 Sri Lankan rupees. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on DCS (various years), Sri Lanka 
Labour Force Survey: Annual Reports.
SLRs = Sri Lanka rupees.
Note: Wages are in 2006/07 Sri Lanka rupees.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on DCS (various years), Sri Lanka 
Labour Force Survey: Annual Reports.
Note: The figure shows gross departures. Department of Immigration 
and Emigration data show that the net departures for any purpose were 
just below 50,000 yearly, on average, from 2009 to 2013.
Sources: Calculations based on Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign 
Employment (2010, 2015) data.
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Chapter 3
Aging and Labor Market Impacts
number of children below 15, divided by the number of 
employed people). 
The decline in the working population as a share 
of the total will have a tremendous impact on the 
macroeconomic structure in consumption and 
investment, affecting long-term productivity growth. 
This will have significant impact on the economy on 
various fronts, including decreasing demographically 
determined tax contributions and increasing the tax 
burden of social welfare, a decline in the relative size 
of the economically active population, a changing 
dynamic in the migration of the labor force, and 
changes in the structure of demand for goods due to a 
shift in the age structure (Börsch-Supan 2003). 
While aging has a broad impact on economic 
development, this chapter will focus on how the 
population aging will affect the country’s labor 
markets. For an aging society with a decreasing labor 
force to sustain consumption levels, productivity 
growth has to be enhanced, driven by increased 
physical capital intensity and strengthened human 
capital. It is important for the Government of Sri Lanka 
to anticipate the potential impact of the demographic 
transition on economic development and develop 
strategic plans to avoid a potentially harsh transition. 
3.1. Introduction
Sri Lanka’s population is already aging rapidly and 
began doing so early in its development trajectory, 
unlike in many developing countries. As noted 
previously, by 2015, 7.9% of the population was 65 or 
older, which was a higher share than the South Asia 
regional average of 5.4% and the lower-middle income 
average of 5.3%.9 
Like the People’s Republic of China and Viet Nam, 
where 9.6% and 6.8%, respectively, of the populations 
are 65 or older, Sri Lanka faces the risk of aging before 
becoming rich. Its population is predicted to age fast in 
the next few decades, and labor force growth will slow 
or even contract as early as 2030. The projection is 
that by 2030, nearly one-quarter of the population will 
be 65 or older, reaching the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) average. 
Two demographic dynamics drive aging: longevity 
and fertility decline. In Sri Lanka, adults are surviving 
longer while fewer babies and youths are added to 
the population. These factors will eventually lead to a 
declining support ratio (the size of the labor force as a 
share of the adult population) and a rising dependency 
ratio (the number of people 65 or older plus the 
____________________
9 World Bank, WDI (accessed 29 December 2016).
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3.2.  Demographic Trends and 
Projections
Using birth and death rates from the latest population 
census (2012), Figure 3.1 presents the estimated 
demographic pyramid for 2015. The chart is not 
particularly pyramidal, suggesting decreased growth 
in the younger populations. The 30–34 age group is 
almost as large as the 15–19 age group. The 20–29 
group is slightly smaller, likely due to out-migration 
of workers that was not captured by the census. 
The 0–9 group (the lowest two bars on the figure) is 
slightly larger, which may be the result of a baby boom 
associated with the end of the civil war. In addition, the 
figure shows good gender balance at birth. 
Overall, the population pyramid shows that Sri 
Lanka still has a gender-balanced, relatively young 
population, but its growth has stagnated for the last 
30–35 years. From now on, the pyramid will gradually 
square out, as forecast in Figure 3.2. In 2015, the 
fraction of people aged 60 or above was 12.4%.10 The 
forecast puts the fraction of the elderly population at 
20.3% by 2035, which implies a 64% increase. The 
older group in the elderly population (age 70 or more) 
is predicted to grow even more rapidly, from 4.8% in 
2015 to 10.4% in 2035. Not only are such people less 
____________________
10 For economic issues, age 60, the current retirement age, is a more relevant cutoff for Sri Lanka than the 65 used in defining “elderly”.
Figure 3.1: Sri Lanka Demographic Pyramid 
in 2015
Figure 3.2: Forecast (midline) Demographic 
Pyramids for 2020, 2030, 2040, 2050
Source: Estimates based on DSC (2015a) census data for 2012. Source: Calculations based on DCS (2015a).
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likely to participate in the labor market, but they will 
also require more social and economic resources for 
pension and health care support.
The demographic shift in Sri Lanka began as early 
as the 1960s. The early adoption of universal health 
care and education in the post-colonial period led to 
an extraordinarily healthy population at a relatively 
low income level. Total fertility declined due to later 
marital age, sterilization, and traditional methods of 
pregnancy prevention, including extended breast-
feeding (International Family Planning Perspective and 
Digest 1978). For the middle-income countries as a 
whole, significant declines in fertility did not begin 
until the 1970s (Figure 3.3). By 1992, Sri Lanka’s total 
fertility was already at the replacement level (roughly 
2.1 children per woman).11
Similarly, in the 1960s Sri Lanka had already achieved 
higher life expectancy than the average middle-
income country. By 2014, life expectancy at birth was 
approaching 75 years (Figure 3.4). 
These early demographic trends allowed the country 
to reap the benefits of a low dependency ratio and large 
young population with free access to education and 
relatively high literacy (Box 3.1). The dependency ratio 
reached a minimum of 48.0% in 2005 (ILO 2016a), a 
huge change from 87.5% in 1960 and 67.4% in 1980. 
The dependency ratio has risen again since 2005, and 
reached 51.2% by 2015. Using 60 as the retirement 
age, the dependency ratio is predicted to rise to 60% in 
2020 and 75% by 2050 (Figure 3.5). If the retirement 
age were raised to 65, the increase in the dependency 
ratio would be less—from 51% in 2020 to 61% in 2050.
PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Source: Word Bank, WDI, accessed 29 December 2016.
PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Source: World Bank, WDI (accessed 29 December 2016).
Figure 3.3: Total Fertility Rate,
1960–2014
Figure 3.4: Life Expectancy at Birth,  
1960–2014
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11  “Replacement level fertility” is the total fertility rate—the average number of children born per woman—at which a population exactly replaces itself from one 
generation to the next, without migration. This rate is roughly 2.1 children per woman for most countries, although it may vary modestly with mortality rates 
(Searchinger et al. 2013). 
20
Sri Lanka: Fostering Workforce Skills through Education
____________________
12 World Bank, WDI (accessed 29 December 2016) 
Source: Author’s calculations based on DCS (various years), HIES.
Figure 3.5: Forecast Dependency Ratio at Retirement Ages 60 and 65, 2020–2050
Box 3.1: The Demographic Dividend in Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka has reaped its “demographic dividend” that had been generated by the early stages of a demographic transition. 
The demographic transition is often characterized in five stages. 
• In the initial stage, a high birth rate and high death rate accompany overall slow population growth. 
• In the second stage, the population expands rapidly as death rates fall because public health, nutrition, and medicine 
improve. 
• In the third stage, social factors and individual preferences often result in a falling fertility rate. The society has fewer 
children to support, and the elderly population is still small. With a low dependency ratio, there are more potential 
workers relative to the total population, making it easier to increase income per capita. 
• In the fourth stage, birth and death rates are both low, and the population is stable. Countries in this stage tend to have 
stronger economies, higher education levels, better healthcare, a higher proportion of working women, and a lower 
fertility rate of about two children per woman. 
• In the final stage, fertility rates have fallen significantly below the replacement level (2.1 children per woman) and the 
elderly population is greater than the younger population.
Some econometric studies find large growth impacts from the demographic dividend, significantly larger than could be 
accounted for simply by the abundant supply of labor. Researchers have also hypothesized that other advantages of a 
younger labor force exist, possibly including greater sectoral mobility and greater willingness to adapt new technologies. 
Sources: Authors; Bloom, Canning, and Malaney (2000); Bloom and Finlay (2009); Population Education (accessed 15 December 2016).
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The demographic transition will eventually progress to 
a low-growth stationary or even declining stage, with a 
persistently low fertility rate and longer life expectancy. 
At that time, society will need to support a large elderly 
population with a smaller working-age population. 
Although Sri Lanka’s population older than 65 in 2015, 
at 7.9%,12 was below the 20% average of European 
countries, it was already much higher than the South 
Asia regional average of 5.4%, and the lower-middle 
income country average of 5.3%. 
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Sri Lanka’s life expectancy had exceeded the average of 
middle-income countries in the 1960s, owing primarily 
to its universal health care and good education. The 
country has an extensive, high-quality public health 
care system that, by some measures, actually performs 
better than the private hospital system (Rannan-Eliya 
et al. 2015). Use of health services is on par with that 
of the OECD countries. These factors explain Sri 
Lanka’s excellent health outcomes despite relatively 
low spending on health, which in 2014 amounted 
to 2.4% of gross domestic product (GDP).13 It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the average life expectancy 
at birth reached a population average of 74.8 years 
in 2014—72.6 for males and 78.9 for females (WHO 
2016b). This is almost 5 years longer than the average 
life expectancy for lower-middle income countries. 
Sri Lanka’s life expectancy is projected to reach 80.914 
years by 2050, surpassing the average OECD level of 
79 years (OECD 2011).15
Figure 3.6 shows three forecast scenarios for the aging 
of Sri Lanka’s population: low, middle, and high. The 
scenarios reflect different assumptions concerning 
some key demographic variables, including total 
fertility rates (the theoretical fertility of an average 
women surviving throughout her reproductive life), 
male and female life expectancies, and net immigration 
rates. For the three forecasts, the different input values 
are picked based on their impact on population aging: 
for example, the high-aging forecast assumes both a 
lower value for fertility and more rapid increases in 
life expectancy, while the low-aging forecast assumes 
the opposite. The three scenarios are not designed to 
bracket the possible rates of population growth, as is 
often the practice in demographic forecasts, but rather 
to bracket the potential impacts of population aging. 
In all three scenarios, the elderly population grows 
dramatically. In the middle-aging scenario, the fraction 
of elderly in the population will have doubled by 
2038 relative to the 2015 baseline. Using the official 
retirement age of 60 and above would yield higher 
figures. De Silva (2012) forecast that the elderly 
population would reach 25% by 2014, implying that 
one in every four people will be in the elderly group. 
https://www.oecd.org/berlin/47570143.pdf
 
3.3.  Labor Force Participation and 
Unemployment of the Elderly
The retirement age of 60 applies to government 
workers and, historically, government workers were 
able to collect pensions at age 55 for men and 50 
for women (World Bank 2012). Table 3.1 shows that 
most of the decline in labor force participation occurs 
around the official government retirement age of 60 
for both males and females. More women than men 
withdraw from the labor market after age 60, perhaps 
owing to the cultural expectation that women will care 
for grandchildren and the elderly at home.
____________________
13 World Bank, WDI (accessed 29 December 2016). 
14 Knoema. Population Projections and Estimates, 1960–2050. https://knoema.com/WBPEP2014/population-estimates-and-projections-1960-
2050?country=1001770-sri-lanka (accessed December 2016).
15 OECD (2011) https://www.oecd.org/berlin/47570143.pdf (accessed December 2016).
Figure 3.6: Forecast of the Elderly Population 
in Sri Lanka, 2015–2055 (age 65 and above)
Source: Calculations based on DCS (various years).
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Table 3.1: Labor Force Participation Trends  
for Older Individuals, 1992–2014 (%)
Year
Male Female
50–59 60+ 50–59 60+
1992 80.1 41.1 25.8 8.4
2006 87.6 43.3 42.1 13.0
2012 86.1 46.6 39.5 13.8
2014 88.3 46.1 40.7 15.3
Source: DCS (various years), Sri Lanka Labour Force Survey: Annual Reports.
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____________________
16 Because the EPF is not a pension program in the usual sense, those enrolled in it are not counted in the estimates of pension coverage above.
17 The employers’ contribution was likely intended to be a benefit for workers, but it is a standard result from public economics that the effect of such policies, the 
incidence, is independent of the nominal split in the funding.
18 Calculated based on asset figures from CBSL, What is EPF? http://www.epf.lk/whatisepf.php (October 2016).
There is a slight increase in the labor force 
participation rates (LFPRs) of older people—for 
example the proportion of 60–64 and 65–70 year-
olds participating in the labor market has increased 
by 3.3 and 2.6 percentage points, respectively (Figure 
3.7). However, international comparisons show that 
the LFPRs for Sri Lanka’s older people lag behind those 
of other countries in the region such as Bangladesh, 
India, Pakistan, and Thailand (Vodopivec and 
Arunatilake 2011). 
A vast majority of older workers are engaged in the 
informal sector, work long hours, and are paid less than 
younger workers (Vodopivec and Arunatilake 2011). 
The working conditions of the elderly reflect the labor 
market duality that characterizes most developing 
countries—that is, government and formal private 
sector workers generally stop working before they 
reach 60 due to mandatory retirement regulations, 
whereas casual and self-employed workers are forced 
to continue working until a very old age (or death) due 
to poverty, or to stop working primarily because of 
poor health. 
3.4.  Pension and Social Welfare 
Services for the Elderly
3.4.1. Pensions and Other Retirement 
Savings Programs
A relatively small share of Sri Lanka’s population is 
covered by pension. A World Bank (2008) study 
estimated the coverage at 10%–15%, and a later Asian 
Development Bank (2011) study estimated it at 10%. 
The Public Service Pension Scheme, the largest and 
most important pension program, covers a large 
majority of the 1.37 million public sector employees. 
As of November 2016, about 578,000 people were 
receiving some form of government pension benefits 
(Department of Pensions 2016). This included 
programs for survivors (widows and orphans), military 
pensions, teachers’ pensions, and local government 
pensions. 
The Public Service Pension Scheme has an 85% 
replacement rate, based on the last few years of 
employment, and the benefits are not taxable 
(ADB 2011). The benefits, however, are not indexed 
to inflation. The scheme is noncontributory and 
is financed out of general government revenues. 
Expenditures on public sector pensioners amount to 
about 1.5% of GDP and account for about 7.3% of total 
government expenditures.
Large private employers are eligible to participate in 
the Employees’ Provident Fund (EPF), which, while 
not a traditional pension program, is still important 
for many retirees.16 The EPF requires contributions 
of 20% of the employee’s wages, with 8% from the 
worker and 12% from the employer.17 Employers may 
also choose smaller programs instead of the EPF. The 
Central Bank of Sri Lanka manages the EPF funds. By 
the end of 2015, the pension program had 2.6 million 
active accounts, with total assets of nearly 15% of GDP, 
making it the largest retirement-related program in 
Sri Lanka.18
Figure 3.7: Trends in Labor Force 
Participation Rates by Age Group,  
2006 and 2014
Note: Excludes the Northern and Eastern provinces.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on DCS (various years). Sri Lanka 
Labour Force Survey data.
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The EPF benefits come as a single payment upon 
retirement; workers are eligible to collect their payment 
at age 55 (men) and 50 (women). The EPF guarantees 
that its plan participants have a substantial stock of 
assets at retirement; thus, it plays an important role 
in encouraging savings for retirement and preventing 
poverty among the elderly. However, the program ties 
retirement benefits to formal employment and does 
not address the needs of most of the poorest and 
vulnerable informal sector workers. 
Sri Lanka has established several contributory pension 
schemes for the informal sector. However, the results 
have largely been discouraging and the government 
has not made plans to replace the nonfunctional 
schemes with viable schemes that would provide 
significant benefits. 
The largest of these is the farmers’ pension scheme 
that was started in 1987 and administered by the 
Agricultural and Agrarian Insurance Board. The fund 
was intended to be voluntary, fully self-financed by 
individual contributions, which limited its success. 
The uptake rate was low: one estimate put the 
enrollment rate at 36% in 2009 (World Bank 2009a). 
Administration of the fund was also problematic. 
While there was no official inflation indexation, there 
were repeated ad hoc increases in payments and 
forgiveness of defaults—contributors’ failures to make 
scheduled payments—but with caps on contributions. 
This generated a very substantial implicit unfunded 
liability and inevitably led to the collapse of the scheme, 
with the burden passed to the Treasury. In 2011, the 
Treasury ceased payments, ending the plan. In 2014 a 
new farmers’ pension plan was announced, this time 
with explicit government contributions; however, the 
benefit levels are very low.
3.4.2. Health and Long-Term Care 
Services 
Sri Lanka’s public health care system is extensive and 
of high quality, far better than that in many middle- 
and lower-income countries. Indeed Sri Lanka’s 
public hospital system performs better than the 
private hospitals in some measures. Sri Lanka also 
has an extensive private system used primarily by 
high-income Sri Lankans able and willing to pay out 
of pocket. 
In Sri Lanka, utilization of health services is on par 
with that in OECD countries. For example, physician 
visits average 6–7 per year, and hospital admissions 
about 1 in 4 years. Not surprisingly, such high levels 
of health service provision are a major explanation 
for the country’s excellent health outcome indicators. 
The outcomes have been achieved despite relatively 
low levels of spending on health; government 
spending on health amounted to about 2.0% of GDP 
in 2014 (World Bank 2016a) with total health care 
expenditures of 3.5% of GDP (WHO 2016a).
The government also actively supports elderly care, 
led by the National Secretariat for Elders. The Ministry 
of Health is fully aware of the health issues relevant 
to the elderly and has formulated and implemented 
many polices in preparation for the increasing elderly 
population. As in most countries in Asia, a strong 
cultural and religious imperative compels adult 
children to care for elderly parents (Balasuriya 2011). 
Women are usually the primary caregivers, while often 
both men and women contribute financially to care 
for older parents. 
The vast majority of elderly people in Sri Lanka live 
with family—only about 6% live alone19—and the 
availability of residential long-term care is very limited. 
Only about 1% of elderly people live in residential 
facilities (ESCAP 2016). There is some public 
provision of residential care facilities for the elderly; 
the National Secretariat for Elders has reported about 
300 “elder homes,” but their total capacity is only 
about 10,000 people (ESCAP 2016). As such, they 
account for a tiny portion of elderly care. Waiting 
lists are long for the existing elder homes, indicating 
substantial unmet demand (Fazlulhaq 2011). A few 
private residential long-term care facilities exist, but 
the cost of using them means that only a few people 
can afford them. So far, government policy has 
focused on community-based care and support for 
family caregivers.
____________________
19  The 6% figure comes from two sources; the first is a comprehensive 2006 survey of older people (World Bank 2008). Unfortunately, no comparable nationally-
representative survey has been conducted since then. However, a survey of 1,125 older persons in Nuwara Eliya district, conducted in 2012, found exactly the 
same figure, providing at least some evidence that typical living arrangements for older people have been relatively stable (Burnet Institute and the Fred Hollows 
Foundation 2013). 
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continue at the same pace as in recent years,22 and (2) 
LFPRs remain constant. The estimates are calibrated 
to baseline economic and labor force growth between 
2006 and 2014.23 
To start, the average GDP growth during 2006–2014 
and the fraction of this growth due to labor force 
growth were calculated at 6.1% and 1.2%, respectively.24 
Then, two GDP series were constructed (Figure 3.8): 
a hypothetical series assuming labor force growth at 
historical rates and another using the new demographic 
forecasts that have been discussed above.25 The top 
line simply projects a continuation of the GDP growth 
rate of 2006–2014. The lower line reflects growth 
under projected slower growth in the working-age 
population. Without other changes, population aging 
will lead to significantly lower economic growth, and 
this calculation accounts only for the most direct 
effects of a smaller working-age population.
Figure 3.8: Projected GDP Growth with 
Historical versus Forecast Labor Force 
Growth Rate, 2020–2050
GDP = gross domestic product. 
Source: Authors’ calculation.
0
700
400
500
300
100
600
200
2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Growth at historical rate Growth with forecast labor force
In
de
x
3.5.  Aging and Macroeconomic 
Fiscal Impacts
Population aging will induce profound macroeconomic 
structural changes on labor, goods and services, 
and capital markets and has significant implications 
for public policy. A smaller share of the population 
will be paying taxes, while government outlays for 
social welfare will increase. The gap between gross 
and disposable earnings may widen, which has fiscal 
impacts for social policy, including pensions and 
health care. 
The decline in the proportion of the economically 
active population needs to be offset either by higher 
capital intensity or higher labor productivity to avoid 
undermining domestic production. More investment 
in education and training is needed to speed up human 
capital formation. The shift in age structure will also 
change the structure of demand for goods. Finally, 
a substantial increase in labor mobility is needed to 
accommodate these structural changes. 
3.5.1. Effects on Economic Growth
An abundant supply of labor and a low dependency 
ratio benefit economic development. A younger 
labor force, as noted earlier, is associated with greater 
sectoral mobility and greater willingness to adopt new 
technologies.20 Yet, even if technology and capital 
accumulation grow, the aging of society challenges 
structural transition and economic development by 
reducing the labor supply and through a potentially 
less dynamic workforce. 
A simple “growth accounting” approach is used to 
estimate the economic impact of slower growth of the 
working-age population.21 The model assumes that 
(1) technological progress and capital accumulation 
____________________
20 See Bloom, Canning and Malaney (2000), and Bloom and Finlay (2009).
21 The original growth accounting framework is from Solow (1957). 
22 These assumptions are unlikely to be correct, but are convenient for isolating the effect of the slower growth of the working-age population. A lower rate of labor 
force growth may lead to less implementation of new technology. And slower output growth is likely to feed back as lower rates of capital accumulation. As such, 
the figures presented in this section serve as a lower bound on the growth effects of slower working-age population growth.
23  This period is chosen based on the availability of Department of Census and Statistics’ Labour Force Surveys.
24 The calculation for the portion attributable to growth input assumes a labor share of 0.66, uses the standard Solow assumptions of constant returns to scale in 
the aggregate production function, and assumes that factors are paid their marginal products.
25 LFPRs are applied by age and sex categories to be consistent with the changing demographic composition of the population that is embodied in the demographic 
forecasts.
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and therefore is not expected to have a significant 
fiscal impact. The government’s administrative cost 
for the EPF is likewise modest. 
Health Care. Several trends will put pressure 
on public expenditure for health care, including 
population aging, the epidemiological transition, 
changes in population practices for accessing 
health care, and medical inflation. The combined 
result could have a significant impact on the 
fiscal burden for health care, especially given 
universal free access to it. Changes in factors other 
than aging that influence health care costs may 
ultimately outweigh the effect of population aging 
on costs. 
The epidemiological transition from communicable 
diseases to chronic noncommunicable diseases, 
which generally require ongoing and sometimes 
expensive treatment, will increase use of 
health care.26 
The history of health care in Sri Lanka and the 
experience in other countries indicate that people 
will want, and will use, more health care as incomes 
increase, even as the population becomes healthier. 
Public sector productivity changes and private 
sector price inflation may substantially outweigh 
the cost impacts of aging per se. Marsh and 
McLennan (2016) estimate that only 30% of the 
incremental costs of health care for the elderly are 
associated with demographic change.27 
Specific analysis for Sri Lanka also indicates that 
population aging is not the most important factor 
driving health care costs. Figure 3.9 plots in-patient 
admissions for women by age from 1996 to 2012. 
In-patient admissions have increased steadily 
and significantly across all age groups. Indeed, 
older women are more likely to be admitted to 
hospital, but so too are many women of prime 
reproductive age. The data indicate that aging only 
explains one-third of the increase in the hospital 
admissions of women in the last 2 decades. 
As in Table 3.2, an alternative representation of the 
results is possible. It uses the forecast GDP level in 
2020 as the benchmark, and shows, for example, that 
GDP would be more than 7% lower in 2030, simply 
on account of the slower growth of the working-age 
population. 
3.5.2. Fiscal Impacts
The dependency ratio is projected to increase during 
the next few decades. As previously noted, with a higher 
percentage of elderly people, the demographically 
determined tax contribution will decrease and the 
tax burden caused by social welfare payments will 
increase. These conditions will put moderate fiscal 
pressures on public finance and the growth of public 
income. 
Pension. Because public sector employment has 
not been growing rapidly in recent years, pension 
expenditure is likely to fall (in real terms) in the near 
future, and not increase rapidly. Pension benefit levels 
may also be modified to adapt to fiscal constraints 
caused by the noncontributory nature of the 
program, with beneficiaries not obliged to pay into 
the fund. However, because public sector wages are 
comparatively low, a reduction in retirement benefits 
may be met with substantial resistance. 
The government’s commitment to the new farmers’ 
pension scheme (section 3.4.1) is relatively modest 
____________________
26 See WHO (2011) for a discussion of the “epidemiological transition.”
27 The forecast model used in this study is not described, so it is impossible to evaluate the reasonableness of the forecast, but at least it indicates that other analysts 
find that demography is not the most important driver of rising health care costs.
Table 3.2: Forecast of GDP Level with 2006–2014 
Working Age Population Growth Rate (%)
Year GDP Relative To Historical Growth Rate
2020 100.0
2025 96.3
2030 92.7
2035 88.6
2040 84.7
2045 80.3
2050 76.1
GDP = gross domestic product.
Source: DCS (2015b).
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cultures emphasize family care, the experience of 
Japan, Singapore, and other high-income East Asian 
countries proves that formal long-term care is often 
indispensable due to factors such as small family size 
and increased migration. In particular, the people most 
likely to need formal long-term care are the oldest 
ones. They are less likely to have income or assets, 
creating a need for collective financing schemes. 
OECD countries typically spend 2%–4% of GDP on 
long-term care, a very big expense relative to current 
government revenue. Sri Lanka currently has no formal 
policy to expand residential long-term care; however, 
given projections of the need for such care in the long 
term, policy and planning for expanding residential 
long-term care should be developed soon. 
In summary, given the existing policies, the fiscal 
effects of population aging will be modest, with the 
largest effect accounted for by increasing health care 
costs. Long-term care will likely become a major cost 
factor, although several years may pass before its 
impact becomes significant. Only a small minority 
of older people have pensions and many of the rest 
have little or no savings. As Sri Lanka becomes richer, 
demand for government help to guarantee the well-
being of the elderly will almost certainly be strong. 
Naturally, it would be better to start planning soon, 
and invest the time needed to design an equitable and 
fiscally sustainable system. 
3.6.  Policies to Maximize Human 
Resources for and Minimize the 
Fiscal Burden of Aging 
As identified in the previous section, the two most 
important effects that population aging will have on 
economic growth are (1) the slower growth of the 
working-age population, and (2) the increase in the 
dependency ratio. Additional sources of labor are 
needed to mitigate or reverse the decline in labor force 
growth. Three avenues for increasing the volume of 
labor available for economic activity are
 (1) increasing labor force participation;
 (2) decreasing unemployment; and
 (3) Increasing net immigration, including the 
  return of migrant workers from abroad.
Global and Sri Lankan experience indicates that aging 
will put upward pressure on health spending, and 
ultimately this additional spending will have to come 
from the government, as the elderly are less able to 
finance their own health care. Access to the public 
health care system is essential especially for the 
elderly poor. 
The current system does well by international 
standards in managing cost inflation and achieves 
high rates of productivity growth in the public sector. 
Maintaining a strong public delivery component and 
public spending at about 50% of total health spending 
may be sufficient to cope with most aging pressures 
until 2030, but an overall increase in spending, possibly 
about 0.5% of GDP, will be needed.
Long-Term Care. It is difficult to forecast the 
demand for and fiscal burden of long-term care. 
Other than simple demographics and morbidity rates, 
factors including social and cultural preferences are 
important determinants. Although traditional Asian 
 Figure 3.9: In-Patient Admission of Women 
by Age, 1996–2012
Note: Some crossing of the lines indicates non uniform increase, but 
this may be due to sampling error, as some of the groups examined are 
relatively small.
Source: Analysis of DCS (various years), Household Income and 
Expenditure Survey.
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One way to increase the volume of labor is to increase 
female labor force participation by removing barriers 
to women’s participation and boosting factors that 
enable women to work; indeed, female labor is 
quantitatively the largest possible source of additional 
labor. Raising the female LFPR to the average level 
observed in high-income countries would increase the 
overall labor force by 17%.28 This would be adequate to 
replace decades of labor force reductions brought by 
population aging, although so long as women remain 
the principle caregivers for elderly family members, the 
aging of the population will provide a barrier to female 
labor force participation.
Several approaches are known to encourage women’s 
participation in the labor force. Sri Lankan law does not 
provide full legal equality for women in the work place 
and could consider providing it, as research has found 
that legal guarantees for women’s equality in the work 
place increases female participation in the labor force 
(Gonzales et al. 2015). Another is to create policies 
that encourage employers to hire workers part-time 
or to allow flexible time employment. Another is the 
promotion of nontraditional roles for women that 
can help to break down barriers between gendered 
economic spheres. General programs to encourage 
gender equality will also be helpful. Encouraging 
employers to provide childcare facilities and subsidies 
may make it easier for women to work. 
It may also be possible to increase older workers’ 
LFPR, although older people comprise a much smaller 
potential source of labor than women. The government 
could first consider increasing retirement ages. The 
civil services retirement age was recently increased 
to 60 and the possibility of increasing it further could 
be considered, given that life expectancies continue 
to increase. Any increase could be phased in to 
prevent a dramatic decrease in government hiring of 
younger people.29 
Retirement ages outside of the public sector are not 
defined by law, and there is evidence that men are 
already working well into old age, especially in the 
informal sector. The most obvious policy that helps 
to influence retirement decisions is the eligibility to 
receive payments from the EPF—which is currently 
age 50 for women and 55 for men. Extending this 
age would likely encourage people to continue 
working later into life, contribute to national savings, 
and potentially reduce poverty among the elderly by 
leading to greater asset accumulation.
Transformation of the economy may also increase 
opportunities for older workers. For example, 
increased mechanization of agriculture would reduce 
the dependence of agricultural work on physical 
strength and health. Similarly, expanding services and 
information technology can produce more jobs that 
are less physically intensive. More generally, policies 
that encourage a transition to the more modern 
sectors can extend the working lives of older workers. 
And better health care for older workers will allow 
them to work later into life; good progress is already 
being made in this regard, with the Ministry of Health’s 
focus on health care for older people.
Reducing youth unemployment will also increase the 
pool of labor, but because the overall unemployment 
rate is relatively low, this would not be likely to add more 
than 1% of productive labor. Improving the quality of 
general education to provide the knowledge and skills 
required in the workplace, as well as better matching 
the skills provided with the demands of employers, 
are important for enhancing youth employability. 
Improving labor market information systems can also 
lead to a more rapid school-to-work transition.
A final important source of labor could be the 
repatriation of workers from overseas. In 2014, 
just over 300,000 official departures for foreign 
employment were recorded (Sri Lanka Bureau of 
Foreign Employment 2015). The total number of 
overseas workers is not accurately known, but is 
likely over 1 million, which is more than 11% of the 
current total labor force. This is potentially a very 
large pool of workers for the domestic economy. 
Further, some employers believe that the large sums 
of money transferred home by overseas workers 
serve to reduce the labor supply of family members 
that stay in Sri Lanka, compounding the labor drain of 
overseas workers. 
____________________
28 This calculation is based on figures from DCS (2015b).
29 Historically, unemployment among young university graduates has created significant political pressure to provide government jobs. A long period of limited 
hiring of young graduates could create a backlash against policies to extend retirement ages.
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The skills mismatch in the domestic labor market is 
represented by the issues of overseas workers. While 
the overseas workers could supplement the labor 
force if they returned home, this may not necessarily 
be good for the economy as a whole. The primary 
reason that people leave to work abroad is to earn 
higher wages than they could at home. Thus, bringing 
many overseas workers home might increase GDP 
growth, because there is more labor available for 
production domestically, but would reduce the gross 
national income because local wages may be unable 
to replace overseas remittances. 
A possible strategy is for the Government of Sri Lanka 
to encourage foreign investments in high employment 
intensity sectors and highly skilled sectors to keep high-
productivity jobs in the country. If wages in Sri Lanka 
increase, overseas workers may consider returning 
home. Wages and employment opportunities in Sri 
Lanka could increase due to labor shortages resulting 
from economic transformation and the demographic 
transition. Thus, good economic policies for growth 
and modernization could encourage overseas workers 
to return home and thereby increase the labor supply.
29
Bridging Skills for Employment in Sri Lanka
Chapter 4
Bridging Skills for employment 
in Sri Lanka
growth of higher education in countries at a similar 
income level. But not all graduates have the skills the 
private sector most desires. This mismatch is also 
evident in technical and vocational education and 
training (TVET), as employers often do not accept the 
qualifications of TVET graduates (ADB 2014). 
To meet the emerging needs of Sri Lanka’s labor market 
and strengthen economic activity, the education 
system needs substantial modernization to equip 
workers to think and act creatively, work industriously 
and productively, and be able to innovate and adapt 
to available technologies to strengthen economic 
activities. 
The public finance constraints and limited private 
sector participation in education present a major 
challenge to addressing the need to align the education 
sector with the changing needs of a dynamic labor 
market. Attempts to improve the quality and relevance 
of general education have been made by introducing 
market-oriented subjects and a more practical-
oriented curriculum; however, implementation issues, 
including financial constraints and lack of resources, 
have obstructed delivery of the expected outcomes. 
The implementation issues could have been caused 
by issues in coordination especially with provincial 
4.1. Introduction
To develop a knowledge-based economy, Sri Lanka will 
need to make its human capital globally competitive in 
critical thinking and innovation. For decades, Sri Lanka 
has been a leading example of a relatively poor country 
that has provided many educational opportunities to 
the general public. Since 1945, Sri Lanka has been 
committed to providing free public education from 
kindergarten through university.30 Completion of 
primary school through 5th grade is almost universal, 
as is literacy among young people. Further, with 
the aim of improving access to general education, 
successive governments have implemented welfare 
programs, including the distribution of free textbooks, 
scholarships for disadvantaged students, free uniforms, 
and subsidized transport facilities. 
Sri Lanka has successfully provided basic education to 
almost all children; however, the quality and relevance 
of the education system must be improved to equip 
workers with the evolving skills demanded in a more 
globalized world. There are substantial mismatches 
between the demand for and supply of workers, 
especially between higher education and high-skilled 
workers (Dundar et al. 2014). Tertiary education has 
expanded, in keeping with the demand and with the 
____________________
30 Although the preschools run by the provincial councils are free of charge, kindergarten education offered by private sector institutions are not entirely free.
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authorities, problems in flow of financial resources to 
the provincial, zone, and school levels from the center; 
improper planning; issues in allocation of responsibil-
ities to the provincial and zone levels; and inadequate 
focus on teacher development. Furthermore, the 
attempts to improve quality by introducing market-
oriented and practical-oriented subjects had 
been hampered by the highly examination-driven 
education system and lack of attention to improve the 
curriculum in consultation with industries and other 
relevant stakeholders.
This chapter analyzes the education system and 
policies; examines the challenges, with particular 
attention to TVET and higher education; and identifies 
high priority areas for action.
4.2. Education System, Structure, 
and Governance 
The public education system offers comprehensive 
coverage from early childhood to tertiary and 
postgraduate education, spanning 13 years from 
about ages 4–18 (Figure 4.1). Access to tertiary 
education is subject to performance on the national 
level examinations and level of school completion.
Figure 4.1: Organization Structure of the Education System in Sri Lanka
GCE AL = General Certificate of Education Advanced Level, GCE OL = General Certificate of Education Ordinary Level.
Source: MOE (2013b).
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Early childhood care and development concerns the 
physical, mental, social, and emotional development 
of a child from infancy (ages 0–3) through preschool 
(ages 4–5). The Ministry of Health is responsible for 
implementing early childhood care and development 
programs for the infant stage. Children aged 4–5 
attend preschools run by government agencies, 
Buddhist religious schools, urban councils, and 
municipal councils (pradeshiya sabhas), or by private 
sector organizations. All early childhood care and 
development centers are regulated by provincial 
councils, which are responsible for quality assurance, 
teacher training, school maintenance, and distribution 
of learning and teaching material. 
Primary education sets the foundation for academic 
development. It incorporates activity-based, child-
centered learning to achieve basic competencies 
in language, mathematics, environment-related 
activities, and religion. The primary stage ends 
with the grade 5 scholarship examination, which 
awards students bursaries and placement in 
secondary schools. 
The junior secondary level incorporates a subject-
based curriculum. School-based assessment is 
introduced in grade 6, where each student’s work 
is assessed through written and practical testing 
procedures. Students who pass grade 9 proceed to 
“ordinary” level (O Level) classes in grades 10 and 11. 
The curriculum consists of six compulsory and three 
optional subjects. At the end of grade 11, students 
take the General Certificate of Education O Level 
examination, which tests them on the subject matter 
they have covered. Passing the O Level qualifies the 
student for the Advanced Level (A Level) course.
At the A Level courses (grades 12 and 13), students 
select three subjects in one of the “streams”—science, 
arts, commerce, and technology. Standardized A Level 
results and the district quota system determine entry 
into the state university system. Students who opt not 
to take the A Level exam join vocational training or 
enter the labor market. 
4.2.1. Higher Education
Higher education includes university (state and 
private) and higher technical education. Institutes 
offering higher education come under the Ministry 
of Higher Education and Highways (MOHEH). 
Universities and postgraduate institutes are managed 
by the University Grants Commission (UGC), 
and institutes offering higher national diploma 
certificates (advanced technical institutes) come 
under the Sri Lanka Institute of Advanced Technical 
Education (SLIATE) as well as the Ministry of Skills 
Development and Vocational Training. Admittance 
to state universities is determined by A Level results 
(considering both the standardized examination scores 
and the district quota system). University entrance has 
become progressively competitive due to the limited 
space available in public universities. 
University education in Sri Lanka started in 1921, 
with establishment of University College. In 1942, 
University College became a full-fledged university—
the University of Ceylon—and is now known as the 
University of Colombo. The University of Ceylon was 
modeled on the Oxbridge formula, and remained 
an elite-oriented university. Creation of an English-
speaking Christian class, from which personnel for 
public services and other colonial administration 
positions could be recruited, was the major 
objective of the colonial higher education system 
(Jayasundara 2014). 
The introduction of free education opened the door 
to higher education for all children, based on the 
student’s performance at A Levels. The district quota 
system, introduced in 1971, benefited candidates 
from underprivileged rural areas. Parliament passed 
the Mahapola Higher Education Scholarship Trust Fund 
Act No. 66 of 1981  to assist students with financial 
difficulties throughout their university educations. 
Institutions offering higher education range from 
public institutes and universities directly under central 
government control, to private institutes conducting 
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degree and professional programs. Majority of 
universities and higher education institutions come 
under the MOHEH (World Bank 2009b). The 
MOHEH, established to regulate, expand, and develop 
institutions in higher education, is responsible for 
developing operational policy and strategy for higher 
education, including the private higher education 
sector. Some of the MOHEH’s operational tasks are 
delegated to the UGC and SLIATE (MOHEH 2013). 
Public higher education institutions include public 
universities, the Open University of Sri Lanka, public 
postgraduate and specialized institutes, and advanced 
technical institutes. Two universities are directly 
under the purview of the MOHEH (Pali and Buddhist 
University and Bhiksu University). The UGC governs 
15 state universities and 18 other higher education 
institutes. Advanced technological institutes are 
governed by the SLIATE (Figure 4.2). 
The UGC is the apex body managing state 
universities and postgraduate institutes. The UGC 
was established under the Universities Act No. 16 of 
1978 (UGC 2106). Its main functions include planning 
and coordinating university education, managing 
budget allocations, controlling expenditure of higher 
education institutions, maintaining standards, 
regulating university administration, and regulating the 
admission of students into higher education institutes 
(UGC 2016). The UGC has also established a quality 
assurance system to maintain the standards of 
academic programs offered by universities and other 
higher educational institutes (CBSL 2016). 
Institutes offering higher national diploma certificates 
(advanced technical institutes) come under the 
SLIATE, which was established by an act of parliament 
for fostering advanced technical education at the 
postsecondary level in engineering and business 
studies. The SLIATE supervises 16 advanced 
technical institutes. They offer courses in accounting, 
management, business, engineering, information 
technology, agriculture, and English (MOE 2013a).
The degree of autonomy and accountability varies 
within the higher education sector. Public universities 
enjoy greater autonomy than institutes under the 
SLIATE in recruitment of academic staff, teaching, 
curriculum development, and research. However, the 
 Figure 4.2: Higher Education Structure 
Note: General Sir Kotelawala Defence University (KDU) comes under the Ministry of Defense and the University of Vocational Technology (UNIVOTEC) 
comes under the Ministry of Skills Development and Vocational Training. 
Source: (World Bank 2009b).
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MOHEH supervises many other aspects of public 
universities. Private higher education institutions, 
by contrast, are almost fully autonomous, operating 
mainly under institutional mandates for nonprofit 
institutions and market forces for profit-making 
institutions (World Bank 2009b).
4.2.2. Technical and Vocational 
Education and Training
TVET has evolved in the last 3 decades, with the 
establishment of many agencies for vocational 
training in the public and private sectors. The TVET 
system allows school leavers that cannot enter tertiary 
education to continue their skills development. TVET 
offers several levels of programs that accommodate 
students with different levels of school education. 
The TVET system comprises a wide array of 
institutions, including public and private sector training 
providers, standards and curriculum development 
agencies, and a regulatory body (Figure 4.3). As 
of 2015, 635 public institutions and 718 registered 
private and nongovernment institutions offered a 
variety of vocational tracks, such as information and 
communications technology (ICT), construction, 
languages, finance, automobile maintenance, textile 
and garments, hotel and tourism, design and media, 
office management, agriculture plantation and 
livestock, gems and jewelry, and printing (CBSL 2016). 
Key public institutions include the Ceylon–German 
Technical Training Institute, Department of Technical 
Education and Training, National Youth Services 
Council, Sri Lanka National Apprenticeship and 
Industrial Training Authority, University of Vocational 
Technology, and Vocational Training Authority. 
Almost all state training institutions have been 
brought under the Ministry of Skills Development 
and Vocational Training, which is a progressive step 
for managing TVET toward a common goal. 
The Ceylon–German Technical Training Institute 
specializes in automobile engineering and the 
National Institute of Fisheries and Nautical 
Engineering provides job-specific training for the 
fisheries industry. Advanced technical colleges, 
managed by the SLIATE, come directly under 
the MOHEH. 
 Figure 4.3: Technical Education and Vocational Training System
Note: Private sector and NGO TVET institutions do not come directly under TVEC though they are registered under TVEC.
DTET = Department of Technical Education and Training, NAITA = National Apprenticeship and Industrial Training Authority, NGO = nongovernment 
organization, NYSC = National Youth Services Council, SLIATE = Sri Lanka National Apprenticeship and Industrial Training Authority, TVEC = Tertiary and 
Vocational Education Commission, TVET = technical and vocational education and training, UNIVOTEC = University of Vocational Technology, VTA = 
Vocational Training Authority.
Source: World Bank (2005).
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4.2.3. The Administrative Structure of 
Education
The public education system remains the predominant 
provider of general education (up to grade 13), with 
10,997 schools, 92% of them public schools. In 2015, 
about 4.1 million students were taught by 236,999 
teachers in public schools, yielding a student–
teacher ratio of 18:1 (CBSL 2016). Table 4.1 presents 
key statistics.
Public schools vary in their management (ministry 
and provincial council) and language of instruction 
(Sinhala or Tamil). Only 3% of public schools are 
national schools that come directly under the Ministry 
of Education (MOE); the other 97% are governed by 
provincial councils. Of the public schools, 63.0% offer 
education in Sinhala and 29.8% in Tamil. The quality 
of the education provided also varies due to resource 
constraints. 
Public schools are classified into four categories based 
on the grade span and the courses offered (Table 4.2). 
Only about 10% of schools have facilities to teach A 
Level science streams.
The central government and provincial councils 
control the provision of education in accordance with 
the 13th Amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution 
for the devolution of power to the provinces. The MOE 
is responsible for making policy based on National 
Education Commission (NEC) recommendations, 
planning and developing the education sector, 
maintaining educational standards, and formulating 
national curriculums. The MOE is also responsible for 
training through the National Institute of Education 
(NIE), providing teacher education, managing 
national schools, administering public examinations, 
preparing resource allocations, and facilitating funding 
and subsidies for students and schools. The MOE 
also regulates teacher education and training offered 
at national colleges of education and teacher training 
colleges (MOE 2013b). 
The MOE plays a major role in coordinating its 
provincial and zonal offices, and schools. The MOE 
monitors and evaluates development plans prepared 
at the zonal and provincial level, and provides feedback 
to schools (MOE 2013b). 
Table 4.1: Trends in Education Provision,  
2000–2015
2000 2010 2015
general education
Number of schools 10,615 10,492 10,997
Government schools 9,976 9,675 10,144
Pirivena schoolsa 561 719 853
Private schools 78 72 78
Special schoolsb 26 25
government Schools
Number of teachers 186,097 215,692 236,999
Number of students 4,193,908 3,932,722 4,129,534
higher education
Number of universities 13 15 15
Number of new 
admissions
11,805 21,547 25,624
Number of lecturers 3,241 4,918 5,525
other Public higher education 18
Nonstate Registered higher education 16
Number of Registered Institutions 
Government and  
semi-government
556 (2001) 939 1,362 
(2014)
Private 252 (2001) 898 1,240 
(2014)
Nongovernment 112 (2001) 240 99 (2014)
Intake 67,612 
(2002)
96,620 
(2009)
254,091 
(2014)
Public expenditure on 
education  (SLRs million)c
30,929 104,248 225,047
Current expenditure 23,794 85,195 169,600
Capital expenditure 7,135 19,053 55,447
a Monastic college (similar to a seminary) for the education of Buddhist 
priests.
b Special schools are for differently abled children.
c Government expenditure on general and higher education.
SLRs = Sri Lanka rupees.
Sources: UNDP (2012); CBSL (2016); TVEC (2015a).
Table 4.2: Government Schools  
by Functional Grade
Functional 
Grade Curriculum
Number of 
Schools
1AB With Advanced-Level science stream 
classes
1,004
1C With Advanced-Level arts and or 
commerce streams, but no science 
stream
1,801
Type 2 With classes only up to grade 11 3,462
Type 3 With classes only up to grade 8 3,877
total 10,144
Source: MOE (2015).
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As Figure 4.4 shows, the MOE reports directly to the 
president and the Cabinet of Ministers on matters 
pertaining to the education sector. The MOE secretary 
manages all activities coming under the MOE, and is 
assisted by additional-secretaries in charge of divisions 
and directors of education in charge of specific 
subjects. The NIE, the Department of Examinations, 
and the Department of Educational Publications 
function under the MOE. The NIE is responsible for 
the development of curriculums, training of teachers, 
and research on education. The Department of 
Examinations handles public examinations. The 
Department of Educational Publications publishes 
and distributes school textbooks.
The provincial councils govern most public schools, 
except the national ones. Each province has a provincial 
MOE and department of education managing schools 
within the province, to decentralize administrative 
functions. Provincial education authorities adopt 
policies to suit the requirements of their schools. Such 
policies are incorporated in provincial statutes, and 
are communicated to schools through the provincial 
departments of education. 
MOE’s National Schools Branch controls the national 
schools directly and overlooks all functions. The 
branch updates policies, formulates plans for the 
development of national schools, and recruits 
school staff. The branch also conducts programs for 
educational quality development of national schools 
and for the proper management of physical and 
human resources  (MOE 2013b).
The provincial councils, ministries, and departments 
of education are tasked with enabling the smooth 
functioning of education in each province and 
ensuring a standard consistent with national policies 
and norms. They are responsible for preparing and 
implementing provincial education development 
plans, determining budgetary requirements and 
distributing funds, managing provincial schools, 
monitoring and evaluating the schools, managing 
academic staff, and conducting training and skills 
development programs for teachers. They also ensure 
educational provisions for children with special 
needs and development of special and nonformal 
education.
 
Figure 4.4: Administrative Structure of Education
Source: MOE (2013b).
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The provincial administrative centers are further 
divided into educational zones headed by a zonal 
director of education, with about 100–150 schools 
operating in each zone. Zonal education offices 
prepare the zonal strategic plan and the annual 
implementation plans based on the educational 
requirements in the zone. Their main roles are to 
facilitate communication between schools and 
the MOE and hold monthly meetings with school 
principals to monitor the implementation and progress 
of school plans. 
The educational zones are subdivided into divisional 
education offices, which maintain a close relationship 
with the school administrations. The zonal office 
delegates to the divisional director the monitoring of 
Type 3 schools (Table 4.2) with less than 100 students 
(MOE 2013a).
Each school is managed by a principal, with support 
from the school development committee, consisting of 
staff, alumni, parents, and the zonal director. Previously, 
zonal and provincial authorities had more control over 
the management of schools. But the current system 
encourages school-based management through the 
Program for School Improvement, which gives schools 
managerial and financial decision power though the 
School Development Committee. The committee is 
accountable for transparency in decision-making.
 
4.2.4. Keystone Policies and Recent 
Reforms
Over the years, several measures have enabled the 
country’s education system to improve the equity of 
education, irrespective of socioeconomic and regional 
differences (Table 4.3). The Education Ordinance of 
1939 and the principle of free education embraced in 
1947 were among the earliest policies for universal and 
equal access to education for all. The free education 
policy can be considered a milestone of social welfare 
and justice, especially benefiting children from rural 
areas and low- and middle-income families.
Two other key historic policy changes directly improved 
access to education: the change from instruction in 
English to Sinhalese or Tamil, and the nationalization 
of private schools in 1961 (Jayasundara 2014).31 
The government took over most private schools 
established before 1961, although some were allowed 
to continue to function as private schools under MOE 
supervision. 
In recent decades, government and public attention 
has turned to learning achievements beyond basic 
literacy. The NEC was established under the NEC Act 
of 1991 and vested with responsibility for formulating 
national policies on education to enable the 
system to respond to changing needs. Although 
the NEC recommends education policy reforms 
every 10 years, the recommendation has not been 
implemented. The NIE was established in 1985 as 
a corporate body functioning under the MOE to 
formulate school curriculums. According to set policy, 
the curriculum is revised every 8 years. 
Following NEC recommendations in 1995 and 
reforms proposed under the Presidential Task Force 
on General Education in 1997, educational reforms 
were implemented in 1997 with the aim of improving 
access and equity, while also improving the quality of 
education. The reforms included enacting compulsory 
education regulations for children aged 5–16 years, 
curriculum reforms, and school rationalization. 
____________________
31  The White Paper on Education (MOE 1964) made Sinhala and Tamil the languages of instruction in all schools and effectively stopped the enrollment of students 
in English medium classes from 1965. 
Table 4.3: Landmark Policies of the  
Education System in Sri Lanka
Source: MOE (2013b). 
Year Policy
1939 Enactment of the Education Ordinance No. 31 of 1939
1947 Introduction of free education from kindergarten 
through university
1961 State takes over schools managed by denominational 
institutions to ensure education devoid of 
discrimination
1987 Devolution of power to provincial councils
1998 Enactment of compulsory education regulations—
enrollment of all children aged 5–14 in schools
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To improve the curriculum, the reforms aimed to 
modernize and improve competencies in science, 
mathematics, ICT, and English, which are deemed 
to be in high demand in the employment market. 
Measures were taken to move toward a competency-
based curriculum from an examination-based 
curriculum, promote English and ICT in education, 
and provide opportunities for children to gain life skills. 
The reforms introduced ICT as a common subject for 
all A Level students. English language instruction was 
reintroduced in 2001 for A Level science streams and 
for selected subjects at the secondary level.
In 2003, the NEC evaluated the 1997 curriculum 
and recommended a set of proposals for a National 
Policy Framework on General Education. Accordingly, 
the curriculum developed in 1997 for primary 
education (grades 1–5) was to be retained, but 
further reforms were recommended for the grade 
6–11 curriculum as it was considered weak from the 
perspective of conceptualization and implementation. 
Recommendations included introducing compulsory 
activity-based projects and practical work in all 
subjects, modern learning–teaching techniques, and 
use of ICT as a tool for learning the teaching process. 
The NEC also recommended provision for teaching 
mathematics and science in all schools with A Level 
grades (NEC 2003). 
Following these recommendations, the NIE introduced 
curriculum reforms for grades 6–11 in 2007, using a 
competency-based learning-teaching assessment 
model. The aim was to improve the capacity of 
students to apply their learning to everyday situations. 
To facilitate this approach, the NIE prepared teacher 
instruction manuals that explained the new student-
centered learning-teaching process that all teachers 
were expected to follow. The reforms also strengthened 
the more demanded subjects, expanding the science 
syllabus, including introducing computer literacy 
under a “practical and technical skills” subject in the 
secondary curriculum. 
The government announced 13-year mandatory 
education, so the upper age limit for general education 
moved to 18 years old. Parallel to the general education 
reforms, two presidential task forces—on university 
education and on TVET—were formed to strengthen 
higher education. The task forces presented their 
recommendations in 1998. They included improving 
the quality and relevance of higher education 
programs and involving the private sector in training. 
Subsequently, the NEC presented a comprehensive 
National Policy Framework on Higher Education and 
Technical and Vocational Education in 2009, covering 
all areas of tertiary education in Sri Lanka (NEC 2009). 
Studies have found that despite these reforms, the 
quality of education has changed little (Liyanaga 2014). 
Moreover, the studies reveal that there has been little 
improvement in the over-loaded curriculum, outdated 
teaching methods, and the traditional examination 
system that requires only memorizing information. 
Some teacher training programs were found to be 
unsuccessful because the resource people—university 
academic staff—were not involved in developing the 
curriculum or the final tests, or in evaluating the test 
results (World Bank 2011). 
The NIE’s evaluation of the 2007 curriculum reforms 
points to several shortcomings, such as not basing 
the reforms on overcoming the weaknesses of the 
preceding curriculum; lack of proper pretesting of 
the curriculum for appropriateness; shortcomings 
in content, teaching methodology, and curriculum 
materials (textbooks, teacher instruction manuals); 
inadequate teacher knowledge about the new 
curriculum; and lack of proper monitoring and 
evaluation (NIE 2008).
Based on the findings of the NIE evaluation, curriculum 
reforms commenced again in 2015 for grades 6–11, in 
stages. NIE officials say the changes are to introduce a 
more skills-oriented curriculum and, as a remedy for 
gaps in teacher training, teacher trainers are trained 
in the provinces with new training manuals. Further, 
for the first time, the NIE has started monitoring and 
evaluating curriculum reforms at the school level. 
Implementation issues are a major reason for the slow 
progress of curriculum reforms. Data show (1) large 
disparities in the quality of education due to unequal 
distribution of resources, both human and physical; 
and (2) differences in students’ ability to afford the 
required materials, which is a major constraint at the 
ground level. For example, although English instruction 
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to 6% of gross domestic product to help ensure that 
the system is delivering the skilled people needed for 
economic growth and development.
Overall, public education investment in Sri Lanka is 
relatively low compared with that of other countries 
in the region (Table 4.4). Of the budget, 80% is for 
recurrent expenditure, and the bulk of that (90%) 
is for teacher salaries and welfare programs (Figure 
4.6). The very limited capital spending on education 
hinders the ability to improve facilities and increases 
households’ out-of-pocket expenditure on education. 
was introduced, it was recognized later that not enough 
competent English-trained teachers were available to 
sustain the reforms (De Silva 2013). Further, although 
the 1997 reforms identified the need for school activity 
rooms, financial constraints limited the ability to 
provide them.
Indeed, lack of funds is a key reason for implementation 
problems. The NEC argued that Sri Lanka’s educational 
policies are formulated and put into practice without 
allocating the funds (NEC 2003) required to complete 
implementation and achieve the desired outcomes. 
Such issues urgently need remedy. 
4.2.5. Financing of the Public Education 
System
As noted, education is provided predominantly by 
the public sector, and its financing is limited by the 
government budgetary processes and constraints. 
Sri Lanka had historically invested 2%–3% of gross 
domestic product in education. This declined 
after 2010 owing to an almost exclusive focus on 
infrastructure investment during 2010–2014 (Figure 
4.5). Starting in 2015, the renewed focus on increasing 
social sector spending targeted education spending 
Figure 4.5: Public Expenditure on Education 
as a Percentage of GDP and Public 
Expenditure, 1990–2014 
Figure 4.6: Share of Recurrent and  
Capital Expenditure on Education, 
1990–2015 
GDP = gross domestic product.
Sources: CBSL (2016); UGC (2014). Source: CBSL (various years).
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Table 4.4: Public Expenditure on Education, 2013
Country % of GDP
 % of Total  Government 
Expenditure
Bangladesh 2.0 13.8
Indiaa 3.8 14.1
Indonesia 3.4 17.6
Malaysia 6.3 21.5
Nepal 4.1 21.4
Philippines 3.4 20.3
Singapore 2.9 19.9
Sri Lanka 1.6 9.0
GDP = gross domestic product.
a Data for India are for 2012.
Source: World Bank (2013).
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Similarly, investment in higher education has been 
held back due to limited public funding. Figure 4.7 
shows that higher education currently accounts 
for 24% of total public spending on education. At 
the same time, the ability of public universities to 
raise funds for improving their standards is severely 
limited. In addition, the government spends only 5% 
of its education budget on TVET. Lack of resources 
has limited the expansion of tertiary and vocational 
education and constrained improvements of its quality 
and relevance to the labor market.
 
Further, the state has monopolized degree provision 
in higher education, which has limited the private 
sector’s involvement. Although there is no legal barrier 
for private universities to be established and function, 
they are unable to offer degrees unless affiliated 
with a foreign university. Some higher education 
institutions have attempted to get the authority to 
award degrees, but they have not been successful 
for political reasons and regulatory issues pertaining 
to controlling educational quality. Affiliation with 
foreign universities increases a school’s, and hence 
its students’, education costs. Notwithstanding this, 
limited placement opportunities in the state schools 
have resulted in the emergence of a parallel system of 
nonpublic higher education institutes, many affiliated 
with foreign universities, to cater to the rising demand 
for higher education. 
4.3.  Access to and Completion 
Rates of Education
General Education. Although net enrollment rates 
in the primary level were 96% and at junior secondary 
levels were 92% in 2012,32 the rates dropped to 81% in 
the upper secondary level (grades 10–11), and 43.5% in 
the collegiate level (grades 12–13).33 
Access to primary and junior secondary education 
is almost equitable across income groups. However, 
children from lower-income groups are less likely to 
access education at the collegiate level—enrollment 
rates vary from 20% in the poorest decile to 64% in 
the richest.34 
Many students discontinue education or do not 
qualify for higher education due to poor performance 
on the national level examinations. Each year, about 
300,000–400,000 students take the O Levels; 
about 60% qualify for A Levels (Table 4.5), and about 
200,000–250,000 students take the A Levels, but 
only 60% qualify to enter public universities. Thus, 
about 150,000 (O Levels) and 100,000 students (A 
Levels) leave the school system without progressing to 
the next higher level. Furthermore, school completion 
____________________
32 Net enrollment rates measure enrollment of the official age group for a given level of education as a percentage of the corresponding population
33 Calculations based on DCS (various years), Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2012/13.
34 Calculations based on DCS (various years), Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2012/13.
 Figure 4.7: Share of Education Expenditure 
by Level of Education, 2014
TVET = technical and vocational education and training.
Source: MOFP (2015). 
General education Higher education TVET
71%
24%
5%
Table 4.5: National Examination Success Rates, 
2000–2015
Source: DCS (various years), Statistical Abstract.
2000 2005 2010 2015
Ordinary-Level 
Examinees (#)
471,309 445,679 433,709 314,635
Qualifying for 
Advanced-Levels 
(%)
29.34 46.61 58.79 58.68
Advanced-Level 
Examinees (#)
183,439 204,030 233,354 255,191
Qualifying to Enter 
University (#)
91,589 116,506 142,415 155,447
Qualifying to Enter 
University (%) 
49.93 57.20 61.67 60.91
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rates vary widely between rural and urban populations, 
males and females, and geographical location 
(Figure 4.8).
 
Completion rates in all levels of education cycles 
show room for improvement. There are disparities 
in education completion rates by income groups, 
as markedly reflected in the O Level and A Level 
success rates (Figure 4.9). For example, in the O 
Level examinations, more than half of children in 
the richest decile pass but only 20% of those in the 
poorest decile do so. Similar disparities are seen in 
the A Level examinations. Although state education 
services are free, parents have to cover fees for private 
tutoring, which has become crucial to success in the 
national examinations. Thus, affordability is a reason 
behind the disparity in passing rates.
Figure 4.8: Level of Education Completed (age 20 and above)
Source: Calculations using DCS (various years). Sri Lanka Labour Force Survey data for 2010 and 2014.
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Higher Education. Higher education and technical 
training enables the country to cater for the skills 
needed by the labor market, adjust to changes in 
technology, fuel innovation, and thus create more 
productive jobs. Sri Lanka faces a major challenge in 
enhancing the responsiveness of higher education 
and training systems to cater to the emerging skill 
requirements.
The tertiary enrollment rate is low: in 2014, only 5% 
of people aged 20–24 were enrolled at a university, 
another 8% were enrolled in other educational 
institutions, and only 3% of the same age group were 
enrolled in TVET courses (Figure 4.10). Sri Lanka’s 
gross tertiary enrollment rate. at 21%,35 is below the 
average of lower middle-income countries (22%) 
and upper middle-income countries, at 44% (World 
Bank 2014). The 2012 population census shows that 
only 470,000 individuals aged 25 and above had 
Figure 4.9: Completion Rates of  
Major Education Cycles
A-Level = Advanced Level examination, O-Level = Ordinary Level 
examination
Note: Completion rate is defined as percentage of children in the 
official age group completing the education cycle.
Source: Author’s calculations using DCS (various years) Household 
Income and Expenditure Survey 2012/13 data.
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Figure 4.10: Senior Secondary and Tertiary Enrollment Ages 15–29, 2010 and 2014 (%)
TVET = technical and vocational education and training.
Source: Authors’ calculations using DCS (various years), Labour Force Survey data for 2010 and 2014.
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35  Total enrollment in tertiary education (International Standard Classification of Education 5 and 6), regardless of age, as a percentage of the total population of 
the 5-year age group following on from secondary school leaving.
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completed a degree or higher-level education, a mere 
4% of that population (DCS 2015a). 
To increase opportunities for higher education, the 
university intake increased from 21,547 students 
in 2010 to 25,624 in 2015 (CBSL 2016). Yet, of the 
149,572 students who passed the A Level examinations 
in 2014/2015, only 17% were accommodated in state 
universities, leaving more than 120,000 qualified 
students unable to enter. 
Furthermore, financial constraints and lack of 
investment in the education sector have resulted 
in a dearth of good quality research and innovation 
within the university system, compared with that in 
other developing nations (World Bank 2009b). Other 
concerns include growing political influence, campus 
violence, and unrest among state university students, 
including constant strikes and reports of bullying. 
Strikes and protests instigated by political parties have 
led to sporadic closure of universities, prolonging the 
time students take to complete degrees. 
Technical and Vocational Education and Training. 
TVET in Sri Lanka has made notable progresses since 
1980 (ADB 2014). The Ministry of Youth Affairs 
and Skills as well as the Tertiary and Vocational 
Education Commission were established to oversee 
TVET activities. Currently, public, private, and 
nongovernment providers serve the TVET subsector. 
The TVET subsector has an annual enrollment of 
more than 150,000 students and operates through 
a nationwide training service network. TVET is in a 
position to address both the quality and productivity 
aspects of labor; however, some challenges remain. 
Regional skill inequality is still a challenge, which 
affects labor mobility. More attention should be given 
to strategic planning, performance-based funding, 
performance monitoring, capacity development, and 
institutional autonomy. 
Further, there is no proper career guidance system 
to advise the school leavers. The flow of information 
between the youth and the labor market is inadequate. 
The lack of information regarding the types of job 
opportunities limits graduates’ ability to form realistic 
aspirations for and establishment of life goals. After 
taking O Levels, some students spend 2 years pursuing 
A Levels in fields that are not in demand in the market, 
rather than entering vocational training. 
Most school leavers engage in casual jobs that do not 
require or nurture valuable job skills. Only about 10% 
of people aged 20 and above have formal professional 
or technical training relevant to their occupation. 
About 44% of the working population is unskilled and 
has not completed secondary education (Figure 4.11). 
In 2014, only 2% of the relevant age cohort had earned 
National Vocational Qualification. 
Reasons for this lack of skilled people include low 
general enrollment in the country’s TVET institutes 
(Figure 4.12). People hesitate to enroll in TVET 
institutes because many employers do not consider 
the graduates to be well qualified for the skills needed, 
and standards vary between institutions. A baseline 
survey of the TVET sector commissioned in 2014 by 
the Technical and Vocational Education Commission 
revealed that only 26% of training programs in the 
overall TVET sector are conducted in line with 
National Vocational Qualification standards (TVEC 
n.d.). Further, the completion rates have some room 
for improvement (Figure 4.12).
 Figure 4.11: Professional and Vocational 
Qualification, by Level of Education 
(age 20 and above)
A-Level = Advanced Level, GCE = General Certificate of Education, 
NVQ = National Vocational Qualification, O Level = Ordinary Level.
Source: Calculations using DCS Census 2012 data (DCS 2015a).
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4.4.  Employability and Skills 
Match
High-quality human resources with science and 
technology knowledge and a skilled labor force are 
necessary to support Sri Lanka’s ambition to become 
globally competitive. A match between student skills 
and labor market demand is crucial for the most 
effective and efficient use of human resources. To 
continue its transition as a middle-income emerging 
economy, Sri Lanka will have to rely on efficiency-driven 
productivity growth propelled by a skilled work force 
that is able to create and adapt to new technologies, 
and has the general skills needed to be competitive 
in the global market. The government’s strategic plan 
focuses on three themes: increasing equitable access 
to primary and secondary education, improving the 
quality of primary and secondary education, and 
strengthening the governance and service delivery in 
the education sector.
There is a wide gap between what is taught in schools 
and what is needed in the world of work. The NEC 
sector review concluded that the country’s education 
system has failed to adequately promote good 
quality and relevant education or to orient students 
to the world of work (NEC 2003). This is primarily 
because the education systems do not transfer many 
productive skills to students. As a result, the demands 
of the market and the skills of school and university 
graduates are mismatched.
The mismatch results from an outdated curriculum 
aggravated by the lack of interaction with the private 
sector when designing degree programs (NEC 2009). 
Nearly one-third of university students are enrolled 
in the arts (Figure 4.13). An MOHEH graduate 
employment census in 2012 showed that arts graduates 
had the lowest employment rate, at 32%, whereas over 
90% of engineering, ICT, and medicine graduates were 
employed, showing that such graduates were highly 
sought after by employers (Figure 4.14). 
 
 Figure 4.12: Performance of TVEC-Registered 
Tertiary and Vocational Education 
Institutes by Sector, 2014
 Figure 4.13:  Distribution of University 
Admissions by Subject, 2014/15
TVEC = Technical and Vocational Education Commission.
Note: Based on data from 287 of the 557 private training institutes 
registered with the TVEC.
Sources: TVEC and Ministry of Skills Development and Vocational 
Training (2015); TVEC (2015b).
ICT = information and communication technology, QS = Quantity 
Surveyors.
Source: UGC (2014).
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Figure 4.14: Employment Status of Graduates by Subject Stream
ICT = information and communications technology.
Source: MOE (2015).
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Figure 4.15: English and Computer Literacy, Population Age 15 and Above (%)
AL = Advanced Level, GCE = General Certificate of Education, OL = Ordinary Level.
Source: Calculations using (DCS 2015a).
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In recent years, governments have recognized the 
need to create an activity-based curriculum relevant 
to the labor market. While attempts were made to 
improve the quality of education through the 1997 
and 2007 curriculum reforms, shortcomings remain in 
curriculum design, development, and implementation 
(NIE 2009).
ICT and English language are the most demanded 
skills in the country. English speakers have access to 
better quality jobs with higher salaries and benefits at 
home and abroad. Yet the population census of 2012 
revealed that, of people aged 15 and above, English 
literacy (ability to speak, read, and write) was just 22% 
and computer literacy was only 23%. As expected, 
both English and computer literacy rates were higher 
among younger age cohorts (Figure 4.15).
As Figure 4.14 indicates, although job opportunities 
were available for graduates of science streams, only 
24% of students were pursuing A Levels in science 
subjects (MOE 2015).  
To address this gap, a new technology stream was 
created in 2013 for the A Levels, and an A Level 
examination was introduced from 2015. The aim 
is to provide students with job-oriented practical 
knowledge and training, enhancing their likelihood of 
employment after school (Box 4.1). Under the 1,000 
school program, a large number of schools began 
science stream, but the increase in science enrollment 
is not picking up as anticipated.
4.5. Policies to Help Bridge the Skills 
Gaps
To pursue its economic transition, Sri Lanka’s 
productivity growth will have to be driven by efficiency. 
The present education system is inadequate for 
producing the required skilled work force. Critical 
issues include providing equal opportunities for good 
quality education, expanding opportunities for tertiary 
education, and addressing skill mismatches and 
skill gaps. 
4.5.1. Current Plans for Improving Training 
and Skills 
Several initiatives are in process to improve education at 
all levels. The overall education policy framework focuses 
on three key themes: increasing equitable access to 
primary and secondary education, improving the quality 
of primary and secondary education, and strengthening 
governance and service delivery in the education sector. 
The priorities of policy reforms include formulating a 
national education policy on general education, making 
13 years of education mandatory, reforming the 
curriculum, reforming examination and evaluation 
systems, strengthening teacher education and 
management, and supervising and regulating 
international schools. The MOE is implementing the 
“Nearest School is the Best School” project during 2016–
2020, to provide equal education opportunities for all. 
Box 4.1: Technology Stream for the Advanced Level
A new technology subject stream for the General Certificate of Education A Level was introduced in 2013. The first batch 
of students in the new stream took the A Level examinations in 2015. The Ministry of Education launched the new stream 
in collaboration with the Youth Affairs and Skills Development Ministry to provide practical knowledge and training that is 
likely to facilitate employment after graduation.
The technology stream was initially introduced in 200 schools and later expand to 1,000. Under the new stream, students 
can select three subjects: engineering technology or biotechnology, science for technology, and one subject from commerce 
and arts.
For students who follow this new subject stream and qualify for the university entrance, a science and technology faculty is 
created in the universities. For 2016, opportunities were available for 2,250 students to follow 28 courses in 13 universities. 
Course graduates will earn in a bachelor of science in technology degree from one of 25 participating university colleges.
Sources: Ministry of Education (n.d.), Technological Stream http://www.moe.gov.lk/english/index.php?option=com_contentandview=articleandid=1325:techn
ological-streamandcatid=419andItemid=1093; Sunday Times (2013). 
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Due to limited public higher education opportunities, 
the government facilitates review panels and 
established the Standing Committee on Accreditation 
and Quality Assurance, to assure good quality 
education while encouraging private sector investment 
in Sri Lanka (CBSL 2016). Furthermore, there is a plan 
to establish an independent accreditation council, 
and a draft bill is being prepared. The World Bank’s 
Higher Education Project (World Bank 2016b) 
will support the establishment of the independent 
accreditation council.
Further, the Budget Proposals in November 2015 
stated that the government encourages the 
establishment of private universities and proposes 
that they should be monitored by the UGC to ensure 
that they provide high-quality education. The Budget 
Proposals included that at least 10% of placements 
in such schools should be awarded free of charge to 
students who have successfully completed the A 
Level examination. The government will provide tax 
incentives to local counterparts of such ventures. In 
2017, the MOHEH launched an interest-free student 
loan scheme (up to SLRs 800,000 per program) for 
those who pursue higher education at private sector 
higher education institutions.
4.5.2. Reforms to Enhance Equitable 
Opportunities for General Education
Availability of Science and Technology Education. 
To foster equitable opportunities for science and 
technology education, it is important to provide 
equal access to education for all students across the 
country. The government’s 1,000 school program aims 
to increase access to science education, and between 
2013 and 2016, the number of schools that offer the 
science stream at the A Level increased from 868 to 
1,016. The government introduced the technology 
stream at 251 schools, and about 170 additional 
schools will offer the technology stream shortly. 
However, the quality of education is compromised 
as even the initial 251 schools are struggling to get an 
adequate number of qualified teachers, especially for 
engineering technology. The same applies to science 
education. While the government invested in 1,000 
schools to provide science laboratories and 251 
schools to provide technology faculty buildings and 
equipment, due to a shortage of teachers, the number 
of students is not increasing as envisaged. The quality 
of education should be emphasized. 
Training and Equitable Distribution of Teachers. 
To strengthen human resources, qualified teachers 
should be recruited for more demanding subjects 
such as science, mathematics, ICT, and English 
according to a proper procedure, through colleges of 
education. Currently, A Level teachers are required to 
have a bachelor’s degree. Unfortunately, the College 
of Education alone cannot meet the demand for 
qualified science, math, and English teachers. All newly 
appointed teachers, including university graduates, 
should be given the initial 1 year of pedagogy training. 
During school vacations, all teachers should take 
continuing short periods of training (2–3 weeks) 
at district-level training centers. Attendance at 
and performance in continuing training should be 
taken into consideration for salary increments and 
promotions. 
To address locational disparities in the provision 
of qualified teachers and improve their equitable 
distribution, incentives could be provided to those 
who work in rural areas. To attract qualified teachers 
and increase their retention, measures to motivate 
them, such as better salaries and working conditions, 
could be offered. Payment of a substantial monthly 
allowance, as practiced in some Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development countries, 
and fully decentralized school-based teacher 
recruitment could also help to persuade teachers to 
accept appointments in schools in remote or otherwise 
difficult locations (World Bank 2011). 
Regulation of Private Education. The government 
could take measures to encourage private investment 
in general education by lifting current restrictions on 
the establishment of private schools. Students who 
can afford private education could enroll in private 
schools, relieving some pressure on the state-
funded schools and providing more space for 
the poorer students. International schools are 
currently allowed to operate, but are not subject 
to proper regulatory mechanisms. All private 
education institutes should be regulated by 
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incorporating new rules and regulations, especially 
for curriculum standards, teacher qualifications, 
school discipline, etc. 
4.5.3. Reforms to Expand Opportunities 
for Tertiary Education 
As noted in section 4.2, limited public resources for Sri 
Lanka’s tertiary education constrain efforts to expand 
opportunities for students to achieve university 
education in the country. Most students who are not 
able to enter state universities opt for a certificate, 
diploma, or degree from a private institution, currently 
offered without state regulation or standards even 
though the UGC acknowledges degree programs 
offered by private higher education institute per the 
University Act. Therefore, it is important to explore 
ways of funding more good quality higher education. 
Quality and standards should be maintained 
through effective monitoring and control. Although 
the proposed Quality Assurance, Equalization, 
Qualification and Framework Bill failed to pass in 
2011, the regulatory mechanism for private institutes 
should be strengthened by incorporating new rules 
and regulations. It is crucial, therefore, to identify the 
standards desired of the private institutions, such 
as their student recruitment criteria, fee structure, 
academic programs, and quality assurance and 
accreditation. New institutions should be allowed 
to start accepting students only after obtaining 
a compliance certification from the relevant 
professional body. 
Numerous countries have effectively combined 
private and public university education. Some of the 
best universities in the United States, for example, 
are public universities. To compete with the nonstate 
providers, Sri Lanka’s state universities should be 
strengthened to become dynamic centers that 
respond to changes in the market in a timely manner. 
Public universities can generate income through 
postgraduate programs and other types of certificate 
programs, but do not have authority to spend the 
resources they generate. They need approval from the 
UGC, MOHEH, and Ministry of Finance through the 
planning and budgeting process. 
Rethinking the governance structure of public 
universities and allowing them more autonomy to 
manage their affairs and raise funds could increase 
the resources available for public universities, a good 
example of which is the Postgraduate Institute of 
Management. More autonomy in managing affairs 
and raising funds should be allowed so that the 
students and their education programs are not 
negatively affected. For example, universities could 
rent out facilities (lecture halls and sports grounds) 
to generate funds for improving degree programs, 
if they first establish a mechanism to share available 
facilities among faculties to reduce the infrastructure 
needs of the universities. 
4.5.4. TVET Subsector Development
Lack of resources has limited the expansion of TVET 
and constrained improvements to its relevance and 
quality. Improved TVET is essential for Sri Lanka 
to respond to the changing labor market needs by 
providing individuals who possess specific demand-
driven skills. Thus, spending on and funding for tertiary 
education needs to increase substantially.
Public–private partnerships and schemes of 
recruitment through TVET institutes directly to the 
industry are essential to increasing the supply of 
skilled workers to business. Two ways such programs 
could be financed, both of which require linking 
vocational systems with industries that can absorb 
graduates, are introducing (1) a voucher system 
whereby employers (state or private) repay the 
education loans of youths they hire that were previously 
unemployed, and (2) a system whereby private 
companies that recruit graduates from state-funded 
training institutes  repay the pertinent education costs 
to the institutes. 
The voucher scheme however may not be sufficient 
to attract private sector training providers to invest in 
infrastructure (such as buildings and equipment) for 
vocational training in hard technology. Most private 
sector training providers in Sri Lanka are engaged 
in ICT training where initial investment costs are 
low. However, graduates of these courses have low 
employment rates to date. 
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Students who are qualified to receive education could 
be given a voucher to cover their fees at institutions of 
their choice. Such schemes motivate the private sector 
to provide education in sectors where vouchers are 
available. Such indirect support of the private sector 
can create competition among schools while directly 
supporting students to gain training. In addition, 
institutions will be forced to perform well and provide 
market-relevant programs in order to attract students.
4.5.5. Reforms to Address Skills Gaps 
To rectify the mismatch between the skills acquired 
through the education system and the requirements of 
the labor market, the school and university curriculums 
need to be reformed by introducing market-oriented 
subjects such as ICT and technology as core subjects 
in each A Level subject stream, especially in the arts 
stream. Curriculums should offer sufficient practical 
courses to provide the skills demanded in the 
globalized labor market. To enhance the relevance of 
education to the market, universities could coordinate 
with the private sector when designing courses.
In addition to employable skills such as analytical 
reasoning and critical thinking, curriculums need to 
foster cognitive skills (i.e., teamwork, communications, 
and work ethics). School education should increase 
the focus on such foundational skills to prepare a 
future workforce that can adjust flexibly to changing 
labor market demands and the skills required.
A minimum of 2 years training is recommended to 
address the skills gaps of students who leave school 
after taking O Levels. The training program would 
entail work-oriented technical courses in fields such 
as hotel and restaurant, construction, and textiles and 
garments. Under the 13-year compulsory education 
policy initiative, a number of such open/applied 
subjects have been introduced to students who do 
not qualify to enter the academic streams, creating 
pathways for easy progression into vocational and 
technical education after completing 13 years of school 
education. Vocational education programs should be 
linked with industries that can absorb their students. 
Therefore, industries should be involved in developing 
the courses, which should also be relevant to regional 
development priorities. Public–private partnerships 
and schemes of recruitment through vocational 
education and training institutes directly to industry 
are essential for facilitating the flow of students into 
the labor market. 
Students and education and training institutes 
need to be aware of the skills required by the labor 
market. Because most students are not aware of 
the opportunities presented by vocational training 
institutes, it is important to identify innovative, rapid, 
effective, and feasible strategies to reach school 
leavers and channel them into vocational training. To 
rectify the information gap, schools should provide 
awareness raising information to students directly 
after the O Level examinations. This would allow 
students to make better informed choices between 
vocational training and continuing to A Levels, and is 
particularly important for those whose O Level results 
preclude their continuing to A Levels. A well-planned 
awareness campaign would involve vocational training 
authorities, private sector institutes, and industry. 
In addition, institutional capacities for delivering 
vocational training programs should be enhanced 
with upgraded training material and equipment. Well-
equipped district training centers with residential 
facilities are needed.
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Chapter 5
the Welfare dimensions of 
employment change in Sri Lanka 
and Sustainable growth
• the accompanying welfare changes in terms of the 
conditions of decent work and status of poverty.
The welfare dimensions of the employment changes 
focus on two employment-related outcomes. The 
first relates to how employment income changes are 
evolving, and hence looks at changes in wages and 
returns to self-employment. The second change 
relates to the nature of transition from informal 
employment into formal employment. This requires 
an analysis of two critical aspects of the change in 
employment structure in each broad sector of the 
economy: (1) the skill levels of the workforce, and 
(2) the contractual arrangements that characterize 
their work as formal or informal. 
The process of transition from informal into formal 
employment is at the core of the developmental 
process, and can be assessed in terms of two structural 
transformations: external and internal. Transformation 
of the external dimension involves ascertaining the 
shares of formal and informal employment in each 
broad sector of the economy. The change in the extent 
or incidence of informality in a sector infers something 
about the spread of adversity and precariousness in 
that sector at a point in time. An analysis of changes 
over time can reveal whether transformation is 
moving in the “right” direction—toward formality. The 
internal dimension is the degree or depth of adversity 
5.1. Introduction
Most Sri Lankan families depend heavily on labor 
earnings to meet their living costs. Economic growth 
changes the structure of the economy and in turn 
transforms the composition of employment, with 
critical implications for the welfare of individuals and 
households from an income perspective. This chapter 
examines the qualitative aspects of the employment 
transformation that has accompanied Sri Lanka’s 
growth in recent years. The economy has experienced 
distinct sectoral changes in the structural composition 
of output. Such changes shift the compositions of 
skills and the conditions of work in formal and informal 
employment. 
This chapter traces how structural transformation at 
the macroeconomic level has been accompanied by 
welfare changes at the level of the individual worker. 
The welfare changes involve returns the working 
poor receive through informal activities as well as 
returns workers receive in the more formal parts of the 
economy. More specifically, the chapter attempts to 
shed light on 
• how the structure of Sri Lanka’s output and 
productivity has changed during recent times, 
• the transformations in employment structure and 
skills that accompanied these output shifts, and 
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associated with informal employment in each sector 
as captured by measures of returns to employment, 
namely wages and income. 
We therefore have employed a fourfold typology to 
assess how welfare related to employment changes 
may have increased or decreased: 
The first, and best case, scenario would be for the 
extent of informality (the external dimension) to 
decline while returns to work in informality (the internal 
dimension) increase. In this situation, poverty rates in 
the sector would also decline. The policy challenge in 
this situation would be to devise a growth strategy that 
does not disturb this positive trend.
The worst-case scenario would be one in which the 
extent of informality is increasing and returns to work 
in informal jobs are declining. Here, the extent as 
well as the depth of informality would be rising, and 
working poverty in the sector would increase. The 
policy challenge would be the gravest in this worst-
case scenario.
There are also two interim states, between 
the extremes. 
The first would be where the extent of informality 
is declining but its depth (measured by returns to 
informality) is rising, as the real wages of those in 
informal employment would be falling. This would 
be akin to a situation in which the extent of poverty 
declines but its depth increases. Here, the policy 
challenge is to enhance returns to informality without 
reversing the declining trend in its extent or incidence.
The second interim case is where the extent of 
informality is increasing but so are the returns within 
informality. In this situation, if working poverty is also 
declining, there will be a trade-off and an associated 
policy challenge. That is, policies must be designed 
to reduce the extent of informality without affecting 
the trend of increasing returns to those engaged in 
informal jobs.
We investigate the welfare implications of recent 
changes in employment in Sri Lanka by assessing 
the change in the nature of employment in the four 
broad economic sectors: agriculture, including fishing 
and mining; manufacturing or industry, including the 
production of electricity, gas, and water; construction; 
and all other services. 
For the analysis, we use sectoral gross domestic 
product data from the Central Bank of Sri Lanka 
and microdata on employment, wages, and 
consumption from two national sample surveys. Of 
the two surveys, the primary source for labor-force-
related data in Sri Lanka is the Quarterly Labour 
Force Surveys (LFSs) of the Department of Census and 
Statistics (DCS), from which national  employment 
and unemployment statistics are estimated. But 
although the surveys have been conducted since 
1990, reliable wage data for employees and 
information enabling the identification of informal 
workers according to internationally accepted 
criteria are available only from 2006 on. 
Therefore, to use the longest period possible, 
the years 2006 and 2014 were set as the end-
points of the reference period. However, 
because the surveys gradually began to cover the 
conflict-affected Northern and Eastern provinces 
only as the war receded in 2008, they have been 
excluded from the analysis. 
A critical component of the analysis of the welfare 
dimensions of employment change is the analysis 
of the change in working poverty. Because poverty 
is determined at the household level, for this part 
of the analysis, data from two of the DCS’ Household 
Income and Expenditure Surveys (HIESs) are used 
that correspond most closely to the reference 
period determined by the availability of necessary 
labor force data from the LFS series. Thus, HIES 
2006/07 and HIES 2012/13 are used for the analysis 
of changes in working poverty (DCS various 
years, HIES). 
For poverty analysis, consumption data were adjusted 
for spatial differences in prices using the Laspeyre’s 
price index36 produced by the DCS using HIES 
data. The DCS estimated the official consumption 
expenditure-based poverty line by using the Cost of 
Basic Needs Approach as the poverty threshold. 
36 The DCS has computed district-based Laspeyre’s price indexes for each HIES for the specific purpose of measuring poverty, by using the consumption patterns 
of 40% of households with the lowest consumption expenditure to construct the price indexes.
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former encompasses employment in the informal 
sector rather than just informal employment. Formal 
and informal shares in employment for the whole 
economy have changed only very slightly over the 
reference period, with the share of workers in formal 
employment declining from 35% to 33% (Figure 
5.1). However, a very different picture emerges at 
the sectoral level. Informal employment shares 
have increased and formal employment shares have 
declined in agriculture. In such a large sector (again, 
accounting for nearly one-third of employment), 
the decline in formal employment from 22% to 9% 
is significant. The movement of workers out of the 
formal plantations subsector, particularly into the 
services sector, may underlie much of this change. 
In agriculture, we find stable productivity, with an 
increased share of informal employment. In industry, 
too, formal employment shares have declined and 
The Laspeyre’s price index is more suited for deflating 
consumption to measure poverty than for measuring 
inequality, and is not a temporal price index. Therefore, 
for the analysis of inequality in wages, nominal daily 
cash wages were adjusted for spatial and temporal 
differences in prices with a price index constructed 
by applying the regression-based Country Product 
Dummy method to HIES data of 2006/07 and 2012/13. 
The definition of employment the HIES uses is not 
time-bound and determines the employment status 
of the survey respondents only according to the 
individual’s income source, as reported by the 
respondent. In contrast, the LFS determines 
employment status only after ascertaining the 
involvement of the individual in any form of economic 
activity through a series of tactical questions, and 
after verifying the duration of such involvement 
(Wickramasinghe 2009). As a result, the HIES figures 
for employment tend to be lower than the figures 
obtained from the LFS for the same survey year. 
5.2. Sectoral Change in 
Employment and Skills 
Accompanying Growth 
This section examines employment change across 
sectors along two dimensions. The first dimension 
concerns formalization. The second looks at the 
extent to which employment change across sectors 
has been accompanied by a change in the composition 
of workers’ skills. 
Formality is defined according to criteria enumerated 
by the 17th International Conference of Labour 
Statisticians (ILO 2016b). This defined informality in 
terms of jobs as well as enterprises. The criteria identify 
the following as being informally employed: family 
workers in formal enterprises, employees in informal 
jobs in the formal sector, own-account workers 
in informal enterprises or households, employers 
in informal enterprises, family workers in informal 
enterprises, and employees in informal enterprises or 
households. 
The International Labour Organization’s definition 
is more stringent than the one the DCS uses, as the 
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2006 and 2014
Note: Sample weights used. Figures in parentheses show the growth in 
productivity in each sector from 2006 to 2014.
Source: DCS (2006, 2015b).
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informal shares increased, but with a significant rise 
in productivity. In contrast, construction shows a rise 
in the formal share of employment from 8% to 10%, 
with nondeclining or stable productivity. Only in the 
services sector has the formal employment share risen 
and informal employment declined, and this change is 
complemented by a rise in productivity. So, with the 
exception of services, the composition of employment 
in every sector of the economy has moved in favor of 
informalization. This is a significant finding, which is 
disguised by aggregate sectoral figures.
It is evident that informalization has been taking place 
beneath the relative stability of sectoral employment 
shares as well as rising productivity. This appears 
counterintuitive because informal workers are less 
likely to be productive than formal workers. One 
plausible explanation would be that the productivity 
of formal workers has been rising faster than that of 
informal workers. 
Although the available data do not allow us to estimate 
productivity levels of formal and informal workers 
in each sector,37 some inferences can be drawn from 
the data presented in Figure 5.1. It is apparent that 
productivity levels have slipped marginally in agriculture 
where the share of informal workers expanded and that 
of formal workers declined. In contrast, in the services 
sector, productivity levels rose while the percentage of 
formal workers increased. Both these observations are 
in line with what the theory would predict. 
The manufacturing sector has experienced the 
most rapid rise in productivity levels even while 
the percentage of formal workers declined. This 
again may have been due to a greater concentration 
of formal workers in more productive industrial 
enterprises and subsectors, which pushed up average 
productivity levels in the sector at large, even though 
the concentration of workers in the less productive 
informal enterprises, which accounted for a large 
share of total industrial employment, caused the share 
of informal workers to rise in the industry sector as a 
whole. Therefore, the reason productivity levels have 
been rising along with informality in the economy may 
be the relative expansion of formal workers in sectors 
and subsectors where productivity has also been rising. 
Another reason productivity levels have risen along 
with informality may be the changing skills composition 
of employment. In fact, the second dimension of 
employment change that concerns us is the change 
in the composition of skills across sectors. For the 
analysis, we define skills according to occupation as well 
as the highest category of education attained.38 There 
are interesting differences. From the point of view of 
education-based skills levels, the share of highly skilled 
workers has increased over the period economy-wide 
and in each sector, and the share of low-skilled workers 
has declined. The share of those with middling levels 
of education has remained stable (Figure 5.2, panel a). 
In the occupation-based skill categories, the shares 
of high-skilled workers have declined in the wider 
economy and in each sector. While the share of low-
skilled workers has also declined economy-wide, there 
are key sectoral differences. The share of low-skilled 
workers has declined in agriculture and in services, but 
increased slightly in industry and construction. The 
shares of middle-level occupations have expanded 
significantly across the board (Figure 5.2, panel b). The 
changes in the educational structure of employment 
appear to complement rising labor productivities across 
sectors (other than agriculture), as observed earlier. 
Increasing skills underwritten by better education are 
likely to have pushed up productivity levels. But the 
composition of employment by occupation skill level 
suggests that the rise in educational attainment at 
the lower end of the scale of educational attainment 
over the reference period has seen an expansion of 
the share of the middle segments of the distribution 
of occupations, thereby eating into the shares of high-
skilled occupations in the distribution.
It is also evident that levels of educational attainment 
among both formal and informal workers have risen 
across sectors, and may be an additional reason 
____________________
37  The DCS’ Annual Survey of Industries and Annual Survey of Construction Industries collect data on output and employment, but not on criteria required to 
distinguish between formal and informal enterprises, even if only by size (establishments larger than 5 employees, and separately, establishments larger than 25 
employees). There is no survey of establishments that covers the services sector.
38 High-skilled workers are defined by occupation as those in the management, professional, and technician categories and by education as those with General 
Certificate of Education Advanced Level qualifications or more. Medium-skilled workers are defined as those in clerical, sales, and skilled agricultural and fisheries 
occupations, or those who have passed their Ordinary Level examination but have not obtained Advanced Level qualifications in education. Low-skilled workers 
are defined as craft workers, machine operators and assemblers, and elementary workers, or those who have not progressed beyond secondary education.
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productivity levels have been rising along with 
informality in the economy at large.  
Figure 5.3 shows that formal and informal workers 
in the services sector have the highest number of 
average years of education, and workers in agriculture, 
whether formal or informal, have the lowest. Workers 
in all sectors were better educated in 2014 than 
in 2006, other than in the formal industry sector, 
where mean years of schooling have remained stable 
at slightly more than 10 years. This suggests that 
better education across the board helped increase 
productivity levels even in sectors and subsectors with 
greater concentrations of informal workers. 
A point to note is the distribution of formal and informal 
employment, and education levels of workers, in the 
agriculture sector. Unlike in the other three sectors, the 
informal agricultural workers are better educated than 
the formal workers, even though formal workers, being 
the least educated across the board, have nevertheless 
 Figure 5.2: Distribution of Employment by Skill Level across Economic Sectors,  2006 and 2014
Note: Sample weights used.
Source: Estimated using microdata from the DCS’ Quarterly Labour Force Survey 2006 and 2014.
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experienced the greatest educational gains. This result 
is due to the particular circumstances of the plantation 
workers of foreign origin. While their education levels 
had been historically lower than those among other 
groups, their educational attainment has risen in 
recent years. That factor may have also driven some of 
their migration out of agriculture into other economic 
sectors as their job aspirations and employability in 
other sectors rose with better education.
To sum up the main findings of this section, it is 
apparent that output growth and rising productivity in 
every sector of the economy has been accompanied 
by near stability of employment shares. This relative 
stability disguises ongoing informalization and the 
movement of the workforce to higher skill levels in 
each sector. This twin process of informalization and 
“up skilling” across sectors is also consistent with the 
profiles of changing labor productivity in all sectors 
other than agriculture during the reference period. 
The first lesson is that rising productivities and skills 
profiles do not necessarily mean greater formalization 
of the economy. The positive external changes in 
productivity and skills have been accompanied by a 
rising informalization in the economy. But how have 
the upgrading of skills, raising of productivity, and 
increased informalization translated into the welfare 
of workers expressed in terms of incomes and wages? 
The welfare dimensions of these transformations are 
investigated in greater detail in the next section.
5.3. Changes in the Working Poor 
The incidence of working poverty (i.e., the percentage 
of employed people who belong to poor households) 
halved between 2006/07 and 2012/13, from 13.8% of 
employed people, to 5.4% or 318,727 workers in 2012/13 
(DCS 2008, 2015b). Working poverty rates declined in 
all four sectors (Figure 5.4). A notable feature of this 
change concerns the composition of working poverty, 
which has shifted across sectors. Agriculture’s share 
of the working poor has increased, from 47% to 53%, 
and so has industry’s much smaller share, from 14% 
to 18% (Figure 5.5). While construction’s contribution 
to working poverty declined marginally, from 9% to 
8%, the contribution of the service sector to working 
poverty declined significantly, from 31% to 21%. We 
next assess the change in welfare experienced by 
particular categories of workers usually associated 
with informality and the working poor.
Self-employment is to a great extent informal in many 
developing countries, but it is a difficult category to 
Figure 5.4: Working Poverty Rates across 
Economic Sectors, 2006/07 and 2012/13 (%)
Figure 5.5: Share of the Working Poor by 
Economic Sector, 2006/07 and 2012/13
Note: Northern and Eastern Provinces are excluded. Figures in 
parentheses show the distribution of total employment across sectors. 
Consumption data were adjusted for spatial differences using the 
Laspeyres’ price index produced by the Department of Census and 
Statistics using the same data to estimate poverty incidence. The 
national poverty line was used to identify the threshold of consumption 
poverty.
Source: Estimated using microdata from the Department of Census 
and Statistics’ HIES 2006/07 and 2012/13.
Note: Northern and Eastern provinces are excluded. Figures in 
parentheses show the distribution of total employment across sectors. 
Consumption data were adjusted for spatial differences using the 
Laspeyres’ price index produced by the Department of Census and 
Statistics, using the same data to estimate poverty incidence. The 
national poverty line was used to identify the threshold of consumption 
poverty.
Source: Estimated using microdata from the DCS HIES 2006/07 and 
2012/13. 
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assess. It tends to transform over time with growth, 
but in developing countries with dualism and 
underemployment, self-employment largely remains a 
reserve of surplus low-productivity labor. 
While working poverty rates among this category of 
workers have also declined over the period, from 11.1% 
to 3.9%, self-employment accounted for a smaller 
share of the total number of those employed and 
in poverty, at 18.8% in 2012/13, down from 21.8% in 
2006/07 (Figure 5.6). 
People whose main occupation is in self-employment 
may also be engaging in casual labor as a secondary 
occupation, particularly if they are in agriculture. 
This can change as countries move toward middle-
income status, when self-employment becomes less 
characteristic of surplus labor at the household level. 
We see no evidence of this transition in Sri Lanka, 
where LFS data indicate that self-employment has 
increased everywhere, by more than the economy-
wide average of 50% in construction and agriculture 
(73% and 66%), and by less than the average in 
industry and services (44% and 32%). However, real 
labor earnings rose from 2006/07 to 2012/13, other 
than in industry, where earnings contracted by about 
one-fourth (Figure 5.7). 
On the other hand, casual employment among 
employees accounts for half of total wage employment, 
and this share has increased in absolute terms by 
30% across all sectors over the reference period 
(Figure 5.8).39 And even though the number of such 
workers has grown most slowly in the services sector 
(by 21%), this sector is the largest employer of such 
workers (40%). 
Average casual daily cash wages appear to have 
increased significantly in real terms in every sector, 
with real wages in agriculture rising most, by 199% 
(Figure 5.9). Therefore, while the incidence of casual 
labor has increased, the adverse effects of this change 
on welfare have been somewhat mitigated by rising 
real wage rates among this group of workers.
____________________
43 Defined here as employees who do not have permanent tenure. These workers are either without a permanent employer or are working in temporary or casual 
jobs. 
 Figure 5.6: Working Poverty Incidence among 
Self-Employed Workers by Economic Sector, 
2006/07 and 2012/13
 Figure 5.7: Average Real Labor Earnings  
of Self-Employed Individuals, by Economic 
Sector, 2006/07 and 2012/13
Note: Northern and Eastern provinces are excluded. Figures in 
parentheses show the distribution of total number of working poor 
across sectors. Consumption data were adjusted for spatial differences 
using the Laspeyres’ price index produced by the DCS, using the same 
data to estimate poverty incidence. The national poverty line was used 
to identify the threshold of consumption poverty.
Source: Estimated using microdata from the DCS’ HIES 2006/07 and 
2012/13. 
Note: Northern and Eastern provinces are excluded. Figures in 
parentheses show growth rates in real monthly earnings in each sector. 
Earnings data are adjusted for temporal and spatial differences using 
the CPD method based price index using Household Income and 
Expenditure Survey 2006/07 and 2012/13 data.
Source: Estimated using microdata from the DCS’ HIES 2006/07 and 
2012/13. 
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The changes in sectoral shares of noncasual wage 
employees are remarkably similar. However, in all 
sectors other than agriculture, casual wage growth has 
outstripped noncasual wage growth. In agriculture, 
noncasual wages grew by 254% during the reference 
period; among casual workers, cash wages grew by a 
still substantial 199%. 
5.4. Wage Growth and Wage 
Inequality in Formal Employment 
Even while the real wages of casual employees across 
sectors grew, low-skilled workers in the formal sector 
have experienced the fastest wage growth among 
formal workers. Between 2006 and 2014, economy-
wide average daily real cash wage rates among low-
skilled formal workers nearly trebled—they grew 
by 198%—whereas they only doubled for formally 
employed high-skilled workers. Consequently, 
inequality declined.40
Figure 5.10 shows that no matter which inequality 
index one uses—the more familiar Gini coefficient; 
the decomposable General Entropy Indexes; or the 
measure that satisfies all axioms of a good inequality 
measure: the Variance of Log of Real Daily Cash 
Wages—wage inequality has declined among formal 
employees. 
Inequality across each skill category by both 
occupation-related and education-related skill 
Figure 5.8: Share of Casual Employment in 
Total Wage Employment across  
Economic Sectors, 2006 and 2014
 Figure 5.9: Real Daily Cash Wage Growth among Casual and Other Workers,  2006 and 2014
Note: Northern and Eastern provinces are excluded. Figures in 
parentheses are the growth rates in casual employment experienced in 
each sector.
Source: Estimated using microdata from the DCS’ Labour Force Survey 
2006 and 2014. 
Note: Northern and Eastern provinces are excluded. Wage data are adjusted for temporal and spatial differences using the country-product-dummy method 
based price index using Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2006/07 and 2012/13 data.
Source: Estimated using microdata from the DCS HIES 2006 and 2014. 
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40 Tail inequality in real cash wages declined significantly, with the p90/p10 ratio dropping from 5.9 to 3.6 while General Entropy (0) declined from 0.31 to 0.18. The 
Gini coefficient also declined, from 0.39 to 0.31.
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category also declined (Figure 5.11). The Gini declined 
more significantly in agriculture, industry, and 
construction than it did in the services sector.
5.5. Conclusions and Policy 
Implications 
Sri Lanka’s economy is experiencing a sustained 
growth in output that has not, however, catalyzed 
significant changes in the sectoral employment 
structure. The foregoing descriptive analysis shows 
how output growth and productivity increases in almost 
all sectors of the economy (productivity remained 
unchanged in agriculture) have been accompanied 
by stable employment shares across sectors. This is 
balanced growth. However, balanced growth and the 
stability of sectoral employment can disguise other 
dynamics of a changing employment situation. 
To look at the transformation in employment, this 
chapter examined the change in employment 
from the point of view of skills and formalization. The 
direction of the shifts in employment is quite clear: 
workforces in each sector are becoming better 
educated and the shares of the middle-level 
occupations are expanding at the expense of the 
shares of both high and low occupation categories. 
Figure 5.10: Change in Wage Inequality 
among Formal Employees, 2006 and 2014
Figure 5.11: Changes in Wage Inequality among Formal Employees by Sector and Skill Category,
2006 and 2014
Note: Northern and Eastern provinces are excluded. Wage data are 
adjusted for temporal and spatial differences using the country-
product-dummy method based price index using Household Income 
and Expenditure Survey 2006/07 and 2012/13 data.
Source: Estimated using microdata from the DCS HIES 2006 and 2014. 
Note: Northern and Eastern provinces are excluded. Wage data are adjusted for temporal and spatial differences using the country-product-dummy method 
based price index using Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2006/07 and 2012/13 data.
Source: Estimated using microdata from the DCS HIES 2006 and 2014. 
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Nevertheless, employment has become more informal 
in every sector except construction and services. 
Working poverty has declined, average daily cash wage 
rates of casual workers have increased, and the wage 
dispersion across sectors and within skill groups in 
formal employment has improved overall at the macro 
level. Recalling the four-fold typology of welfare change 
with which we began this chapter, we are in a position 
to determine whether the changes in employment in 
each of the four sectors have been unambiguously 
good, unambiguously bad, or somewhere in between. 
In the agriculture sector, we found that the share of 
informal employment has increased from 78% to 91% 
from 2006 to 2014,41 but that casual wages in the sector 
have also increased. Working poverty in agriculture has 
declined substantially, from 22.1% to 9.6% between 
2006/07 and 2012/13. Positive developments have 
been overshadowed by the extent of informality in the 
sector, the fact that informality has been increasing, 
and the slight decline of productivity levels. Thus, in 
terms of the four-fold typology, agriculture typifies the 
second interim case where informality is increasing but 
returns within informality are also increasing. In this 
situation, because working poverty has also declined, 
there is a trade-off and an associated policy challenge. 
That is, agriculture policies must be designed to reduce 
the extent of informality without affecting the direction 
of change in indicators of returns to employment of 
those engaged in informal agricultural jobs. 
Changes in industrial employment outcomes also fall 
into the same interim type of change that characterizes 
the changes in agriculture. Informal employment’s 
dominance in the sector has increased from 55% to 
59%. But in industry, productivity has risen rather than 
fallen, and casual wage rates have also risen while 
working poverty declined from 11% to 5%. Thus, in this 
sector, some improvements in the depth indicators 
have been counteracted by the rise in the scale of 
informality.
On the face of it, construction may appear to 
qualify as the best case in the fourfold typology of 
unambiguously positive changes. The share of informal 
employment has fallen from 92% to 90%, casual wages 
have risen, and working poverty has fallen from 12.6% 
to 7.1%. While this is indeed an unambiguous case of 
improvement, it is also quite clear that the levels of 
informal employment are so high—in fact the highest 
in all the sectors—that the unambiguous improvement 
makes only a small dent in the scale of the problem.
In contrast, the services sector appears to showcase an 
unambiguous case of improvement in both extent and 
depth. The share of informal employment has fallen 
from 56% to 52%. Casual real wages have also risen 
significantly, even though more slowly than in other 
sectors. Working poverty has declined from 9.1% to 
2.6%. However, the question of how sustainable this 
may be is an important one. The positive changes may 
have something to do with the expansion in the share 
of the public sector total employment in the services 
sector from 26% to in 2006 to 29% in 2014.
Sri Lanka has been prone to distributional conflict 
at least since the first youth insurrection of 1971, 
and as a society that has only recently emerged 
from a decades-long conflict that began over issues 
of distribution related to jobs and resources, the 
country remains vulnerable to conflict. Policy makers 
cannot afford to be complacent about the current 
economic growth and slow structural transformation, 
as they also need to recognize that a new source for 
social instability and conflict lies in growing informal 
employment. Working poverty may have declined 
among informal workers, but many workers are still 
unlikely to have decent incomes and even less likely to 
have job security. Decent incomes and job security are 
important expectations that working people have in 
middle-income economies.
While internal transformation in one important aspect 
of informal work (rising real wages and a decline 
in working poverty) is both a critical and welcome 
development, it does not mean that the transition 
to formality is being affected robustly. The extent of 
formal employment is low, and changes in its incidence 
are slow in Sri Lanka. The high incidence of informality 
is a major challenge to the rights of workers and decent 
working conditions as most workers are in informal 
employment not by choice, but by circumstance. It 
____________________
41 The increase in informality may be due to workers moving out of the formal plantations into other jobs.
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also has a negative impact on enterprises, public 
revenues, the government’s scope of action, the 
soundness of institutions, and fair competition. 
Therefore, transition from informality to formality is 
essential for inclusive development and decent work 
for all. In fact, the analysis in this chapter suggests 
that the most pressing employment challenge that 
Sri Lanka faces is transitioning from informality to 
formality. 
There may be many reasons why the growth of 
formal employment is constrained and the transition 
to formality has regressed in some respects. The 
law governing retrenchment makes it very costly for 
firms with more than 14 workers to lay them off, 
and has been identified by many as an underlying 
reason for low rates of job creation in formal 
enterprises (see Abidoye, Orazem, and Vodopivec 
2009). The Inland Revenue Act and the Payment of 
Gratuities Act become operative at the threshold of 
15 workers. 
Issues related to law and order, uncertain 
government policy, macroeconomic instability, high 
cost of obtaining external financing, and serious 
infrastructure constraints in electricity generation 
and transport have also been identified as inhibiting 
formal job growth (World Bank 2005, ADB 2005). 
More recent work has drawn attention to the role of 
skills gaps in constraining economic expansion (Dutz 
and O’Connell 2013; Dundar et al. 2014). Meanwhile, 
the country’s system of labor administration is weak, 
constrained by insufficient cadres, and low levels 
of remuneration and motivation (Chandrasiri and 
Gunatilaka 2015). 
These factors suggest that the structural trans-
formation that needs to take place in a country that 
is on the cusp of becoming a full-fledged middle 
income country has to be supported by legislative and 
institutional complements, including those related to 
social security. In line with the International Labour 
Organization’s Recommendation 204 concerning 
transition from the informal to the formal economy, Sri 
Lankan policy makers need to first assess and diagnose 
the factors, characteristics, causes, and circumstances 
of informality in the national context. The policy makers 
also need to adopt, review, and enforce national laws 
and regulations to ensure appropriate coverage and 
protection of all categories of workers and economic 
units. The imminent decline in the share of the 
working-age population makes the implementation 
of decent work standards both imperative and urgent 
even from an economic efficiency point of view. To 
facilitate the transition to the formal economy, an 
integrated policy framework needs to be included in 
national development strategies and plans as well as 
in poverty reduction strategies to ensure coherence 
and coordination across different levels and entities 
of government. 
Workers have, of course, the most to gain from such 
a transformation. By moving to formal employment, 
they can look forward to decent work, access to social 
protection, and working conditions that ensure safety 
and health. Employers can hope to gain a level playing 
field so that businesses can compete fairly with one 
another. By effecting such a transition, the government 
would acquire a revenue base for tax collection, 
improve working conditions, and enhance social justice 
and stability.
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Chapter 6
concluding Remarks
high-income countries would increase the overall 
labor force by 17%, which would be adequate to 
replace decades of labor force reductions brought 
by population aging. This study has identified several 
policy recommendations to encourage female labor 
force participation, such as the creation of policies 
that encourage employers to hire female workers on 
flexible time basis and the provision of subsidized 
childcare. Receipts of remittances from abroad as well 
as the earnings of the male household members are 
identified as disincentives for married women to enter 
the labor market.
 
Second, for Sri Lanka to continue its transition as a 
middle-income emerging economy, it will have to rely 
on efficiency-driven productivity growth. This calls 
for a concerted effort to align the country’s education 
with the skills and knowledge that the labor market 
demands, to ensure that students are equipped for 
work after leaving school. The country is on the right 
track with its medium-term strategic plan, which 
focuses on increasing equitable access to primary 
and secondary education, improving the quality of 
primary and secondary education, and strengthening 
governance and service delivery in the education 
sector. The government should encourage more 
privately run technical and vocational education and 
training (TVET) institutions to enter the market. For 
TVET, this report proposes adopting a voucher system 
Sri Lanka has enjoyed relatively good economic growth 
in the last decade despite several internal and external 
shocks that dampened financial growth. The country 
achieved middle-income status in 2010 and is on its 
way to achieving upper middle-income status in the 
next few years. To help Sri Lanka transition to upper 
middle-income country and beyond, the government 
laid out a policy development program in 2017 that aims 
to achieve a modern, globally competitive, and high 
value-adding economy, to be accomplished through 
the creation of jobs, expansion of the middle class, 
and improved living standards of workers. This report 
examined in some detail the state of employment and 
education in Sri Lanka and puts forth several policy 
recommendations to address issues and bottlenecks 
identified that may hinder the country from reaching 
its goal. The report also examined how the country’s 
economic growth has impacted job creation and 
poverty and inequality reduction.   
Several findings dominate the narrative. First, with 
the expected contraction of the labor force, the 
government could consider devising more ways of 
encouraging females to join the labor force. The 
country’s female labor force participation rate has 
been historically low, and Sri Lanka does not have 
full legal equality for women in the work place. This 
report estimated that raising the female labor force 
participation rate to the average level observed in 
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as a means of both funding TVET education and 
linking graduates with relevant industries. The study 
also pushes for reforms to the school and university 
curricula by introducing more market-oriented 
subjects such as information and communication 
technology and technological subjects that are 
deemed essential skills in today’s marketplace. It is 
also crucial for the government to provide resource 
support, in the form of skilled teachers and equipment. 
To address the labor market information gap among 
school leavers, it is important to identify innovative, 
rapid, effective, and feasible strategies of reaching 
early school leavers so they can be equipped with the 
vocational skills necessary to take on productive jobs 
and contribute to economic growth. 
Third, the country is facing an aging population, which 
will slow the growth of the labor force, and possibly cause 
it and the economy as a whole to contract (resulting 
in a reduction of 7% in gross domestic product by 
2030). This study predicts that aging will put modest 
pressures on pension and health expenditures, and 
the government still has to take the steps necessary to 
ensure that the country transitions well into this phase. 
Maintaining a strong public delivery component and 
public spending at about 50% of total health spending 
may be sufficient to cope with most aging pressures 
until 2030, but there will be some need for an overall 
spending increase, possibly in the range of 0.5% of gross 
domestic product. Moreover, given the substantial 
unmet demand and the impending rise in spending 
for residential long-term care, development of policy 
and planning for expanding residential long-term care 
should begin as soon as feasible. In a similar vein, in 
light of increasing life expectancy, the government 
may consider increasing the official retirement age 
from 60 to 65 to allow adult workers to continue to 
contribute to national savings, as well as potentially 
to reduce poverty among the elderly by leading to 
greater asset accumulation. The government’s plan 
for modernization will greatly help in this regard, and 
ideally would reduce the dependence of work on 
physical strength and health. 
Fourth, despite recent economic gains and the 
advances in reducing poverty and inequality, Sri Lanka’s 
economy is undergoing some informalization, posing 
a major challenge to workers’ welfare and their rights 
to decent work, and negatively impacting enterprises, 
public revenues, and the soundness of institutions and 
fair competition. Therefore, one of the most pressing 
employment challenges that Sri Lanka is facing is 
transitioning from informality to formality. This report 
proposes undertaking an assessment and diagnostic 
study to determine the characteristics, causes, 
and circumstances of informality in the national 
context. The government would also need to adopt, 
review, and enforce national laws and regulations to 
ensure appropriate coverage and protection of all 
categories of workers, whether they are in the formal 
or the informal sector. Such policies and regulations 
need to be included in national development strategies 
and plans as well as in poverty reduction strategies in 
order to ensure coherence and coordination across 
levels and entities of government. 
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